第八十五章《胡适英文论著：中国外交》（2）

  第八十五章《胡适英文论著：中国外交》（2）

  After all, emigration must be a voluntary affair, and its success largely depends upon the ability of the emigrants to survive the new climatic conditions and compete economically with the indigenous population. The Japanese agricultural emigrant is never at home in the severe climates, and as an individual he is not able to compete successfully with the Chinese farmer or trader. Therefore, thirty years of military conquest and political domination in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria have not helped to solve the Japanese problem of population pressure.
  It seems quite clear that, after all, much of the talk about population pressure is unreal, and is entertained only as a thin justification for naked territorial aggression; for it is an undeniable fact that the have-not nations are the very nations which are consciously and most energetically encouraging rapid growths in their population. Only yesterday (March 31) we read Mussolini expressing his great satisfaction in the fact that "within the current year Italy will have forty-four million inhabitants" and "in ten years it will attain in its home territory alone fifty million." And the explanation is not far to seek; for Mussolini said in the same speech: "Without men the battalions cannot be made, and it takes many men to make big battalions."
  Certainly Japan, which prohibits the sale of birth control literature and appliances and which repeatedly refuses to permit Mrs. Margaret Sanger to land in Japan, is not really worried about the pressure of population!
  THE QUESTION OF RAW MATERIALS
  Next, I wish to point out that it is equally fallacious to say that it is necessary for a nation to rely upon force for insuring supplies of raw materials. It is a generally accepted truism that, in time of peaceful and normal commerce, raw materials of all nations are open to all who can pay for them. A nation like Japan, which imports rubber, oil, iron ore, pig iron, scrap iron, tin, lead, nickel, and aluminum from foreign countries, is always welcomed as a best customer. No force or political domination is necessary to insure the constant supply of all needed materials for her industries.
  Moreover, it does not pay a nation to replace the normal supply of raw materials by artificially and politically creating new sources, because such attempts at economic self-sufficiency often lead to ill feeling, resentment and retaliation on the part of old suppliers of such materials. Suppose Japan can control North China and convert it into a politically dominated region for increased production of cotton and wool, which shall in the not too distant future replace a great portion of her present import of cotton from America and India, and of wool from Australia. The economic dislocation thus created in the cotton and wool countries will naturally produce international reactions, the seriousness of which no amount of economic gain can easily offset.
  And, after all, it is physically impossible for any nation, or even for any economic bloc of nations, to secure political control of all possible sources of raw materials. That is to say, strictly speaking, economic self-sufficiency is impossible. Even the Unites States must depend upon the outside world for rubber, tin, nickel, and manganese; even the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is deficient in rubber, tin, bauxite, and nickel. Even the British Empire has to rely upon outside supply of petroleum and cotton.
  The case of Japan is even more serious. By conquest of the whole of Manchuria, she can increase her supplies of coal, iron ore, timber, salt, and soy beans. But she needs cotton, wool, coking coal, and more iron and coal; so she has been talking about an economic bloc of Japan and the so-called Manchukuo , and North China. Suppose she secures complete control of North China (which I am sure she cannot), it will take decades to develop the new supplies of cotton and wool, and it will take stupendous capital investments to develop mining and new transportation in order to make the coal and iron of Shansi and Shensi accessible to Japanese industry. But, even then, she will have further to conquer southwestern China in order to control the supply of antimony, tungsten, tin, and wool oil. And suppose she could complete her Chinese conquest (which, again, she cannot), she would still be completely lacking in oil, rubber, potash, bauxite, and nickel, and partly deficient in copper, lead, zinc, phosphates, and wool.
  The logical conclusion of economic self-sufficiency is the conquest of the whole world!
  POLITICAL AMBITION
  Apart from its economic absurdities, the force philosophy of the have-nots is politically suicidal. As a matter of historical truth, the philosophy of the have-nots is essentially political in nature and origin, its economic doctrines being largely superimposed rationalizations. It is absurd, for example, to talk about population pressure and at the same time actively encourage population growth! Behind the economic jargon, the real motivating force is a fantastic dream of unlimited political power. Hitler dreams of his new Germanic Empire; Mussolini, his new Roman Empire; and the Japanese military, their great continental Japanese Empire and their world empire which, as Hideyoshi dreamed three hundred years ago, shall cover the whole world wherever the sun shines.
  In attempts to secure political power, the dictators of the have-not nations have been fairly successful. Mussolini, in thirteen years, has remade Italy; Hitler, in six years, has forcefully brought about many redresses of Germany's grievances under the Peace Treaty of Paris. And the Japanese military, too, have succeeded in at least temporarily reconsolidating their political power against the dangers of a rising industrial democracy which threatened to limit the political control of the military caste.
  But this political success of an individual or a class should not blind us to the stupendous losses which their respective nations have had to sustain in increased national economic burdens, in sacrifices of individual liberty and standards of living, and in the international enmity and antagonism aroused all round.
  Take the case of Japan. In the seven years since her first invasion of China in 1931, Japan has had to increase her national expenditure by four times, her military and naval expenditure by eight times, and her national debt by almost 100 per cent. And the war in China is only eight months young. It is estimated by expert economists that the total gold reserve of Japan, including her newly mined gold, will be exhausted by the end of 1938, and that by the same time there will be at least five billion yen's worth of unsold government bonds which the market cannot possibly absorb.
  And what a degradation of Japan's position in the family of nations in these six years! Prior to 1931, Japan sat at Geneva as one of the "Big Four," enjoying the honor and respect of the whole world. Now, she is the nation unanimously condemned by sixty nations as the lawbreaker, the aggressor, and the disturber of world peace! Instead of enjoying the highest respect of an ordered world, she is now finding herself in the necessity of fighting desperately in order to maintain her prestige and position!
  Without indulging in idle speculations as to the ultimate outcome of the war, it is safe to say at least that Japan is much worse off today than she was in 1931, and that politically she has lost everything she enjoyed before she embarked on her path of aggression. Politically she has degraded herself from an unquestionably supreme power of the Western Pacific into one of the belligerents fighting desperately, as she herself claims, for her very existence. And it is quite possible for a nation to throw overboard almost overnight all the wonderful achievements of six decades of hard labor.
  FALLACY OF AGGRESSION
  Herein lies the fundamental political fallacy of this philosophy of the have-nots which seeks to destroy the status quo in order that they themselves may have more possessions at the expense of other peoples. It fails to understand and appreciate the political importance of an international order which not merely protects the status quo of the small and weak nations, but also guarantees and legalizes the possessions, the power, and the prestige of the great and strong nations. It fails to understand that law and order, internationally as well as internally, however troublesome and inconvenient they may seem to our selfish desires, are better than anarchy and chaos.
  The same restrictions of law and order that restrain the strong from plundering the weak, at the same time protect the status quo of the great and the powerful. You cannot destroy the status quo of somebody else without at the same time undermining the very foundation of law and order which, and which alone , guarantees your own rights and your own security.
  It has taken political science a century to accept the view that there is no such thing as a natural right of the individual, and that a right is that which society or the state recognizes and guarantees an individual to enjoy against its infringement by others. It is high time for political thinkers to prove to the aggressor nations that there is no such thing as a natural right of the strong in the family of nations; that the possessions of the strong are just as much protected by a generally accepted scheme of law and order as those of the weak; that no nation, however strong, can ever feel secure in a situation of international anarchy; and that the aggressors, in their ruthless strife for more possessions by disregarding all legal restrictions and treaty obligations, are constantly in danger of losing what they already have.
  Where is Austria now, which was one of the great powers before 1914? And where is that great Germany now, which in 1914 was first in science and art, in education and social legislation, in technology and industry—first in all arts of peace as well as of war—where is she now?
  Even the comparative success of Hitler and Mussolini in their use of force to upset the postwar status quo does not prove an exception to these general considerations. Indeed, Hitler and Mussolini are exceptions that prove the rule. Have they not been seriously troubled by the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition of situations brought about by force in violation of existing bonds of international law and order? Why is it that the "recognition of Manchukuo" by tiny Salvador some years ago was hailed in Tokyo as a great Japanese diplomatic success? Why is it that British willingness to reopen the question of recognition of Italian conquest of Ethiopia at the coming meeting of the League of Nations should figure so prominently in the new British-Italian negotiations? Is it not because those who have set out to destroy the status quo of the postwar world have also found it most inconvenient to have its new status unrecognized and therefore unprotected by the very international order against which they had loudly protested?
  A Chinese philosopher of the second century B.C. once told his Emperor:"Sire, you have conquered the empire on horseback, but can you rule it on horseback too?" Even the aggressors themselves are demonstrating to the world that mere might does not make right, and that no nation is secure in its possessions and dominion without being recognized and legitimatized by some form of international order.
  THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE
  This brings me to a discussion of the philosophy of force in general. The greatest tragedy in international thinking today, it seems to me, lies in the fact that both the chauvinists and the isolationist pacifists agree in their reliance upon force. They both believe that force is the only solution. They all fail to see that what is wrong with the world today is not that force prevails, but that force does not and cannot prevail.
  In the whole history of mankind, there has never been a greater display of force than the last World War, in which two hundred billions of dollars were spent and sixty-five million men were mobilized by both sides, of which eight and a half million were killed and twenty-one million were wounded. What did that most stupendous use of force accomplish? Nothing—practically nothing!
  Why could not the greatest employment of force achieve anything? Because force was not used in an organized form. Because force was wasted in the process of creating rival forces which canceled each other and resulted in mutual destruction.
  Force cannot prevail until it is organized and directed towards a common desirable objective, so as to minimize resistance and friction and to insure the maximum economy and efficiency in its expenditure. When force is thus organized and directed toward the co?perative achievement of some positive ends of common interest, it becomes law and order. For law is nothing but, in the words of John Dewey, "a statement of the conditions of the organization of energies (forces) which, when unorganized, would result in violence—that is, destruction and waste."
  The best example of organized and efficient use of force is the traffic signals at the street-corners in the cities. These green and red light-signals are not always guarded by policemen armed with guns or machine guns, and yet they are respected by all motorists and pedestrians who understand that they represent the organized force of the community directed towards a generally acknowledged objective of common interest. These automatically operated light-signals have become a part of the law and order of the community.
  As a philosopher, I may be permitted to venture a prophecy that the gravity of the world situation, the prevalence of international anarchy, and the frightfully costly wastefulness of "rugged individualism" in armaments and defense, will before long compel mankind to realize the futility of unorganized force, and to endeavor to revive, reform, and reinforce that world order which represented decades of idealistic thinking, and the destruction of which by the aggressor nations is now threatening to plunge humanity into the abyss of another world conflagration.
  It is only in a world under some form of law and order that the have-nots and the haves may live in peace and prosper by sharing what they have.
  What Can America Do in the Far East Situation
  The China Weekly Review
  Sep. 24, 1938. Vol. 86.
  This is my proposition: While I fully sympathize with your nationwide desire to keep out of the war, I cannot help thinking that mere negative pacifism without being backed by a constructive peace policy is never sufficient to guarantee to you the peace you so dearly desire. What China expects of America—indeed what the whole civilized world expects of America—is an active and positive leadership for international peace and justice, a leadership to prevent wars, to call a halt to aggressions, to plan and cooperate with the democracies of the world to bring about collective security, and to make this world at least safe for humanity to live in.
  "I am sure that the people of this great republic have enough imagination to realize that this country is sufficiently powerful to undertake such active constructive leadership for peace without incurring the risk of being involved in international intrigues and wars. On the contrary, it may turn out that such active international leadership may be after all the only effective means to achieve the end of keeping yourselves out of the war.
  "When 32 years ago, a great American President called a halt to a bloody war and brought about peace between Japan and Russia, did he thereby involve this country in a war?
  "When again 17 years ago, the American Government called the Washington Conference which gave ten years of peace to the Far East and which put a brake on the rivalry in naval armaments for ten years, did it thereby involve this country in a world war?"
  That was what I said to the American nation nine months ago. During these nine months three sets of events have developed in connection with the Far Eastern situation, and I am sure these developments have not escaped your notice. First, China has been literally bleeding to death. There have been one million war casualities, including the killed and wounded. These are now, according to most conservative estimates, at least 60,000,000 civilian sufferers who are fleeing the armies of the invader and are roving the country without shelter, without medical aid, and in most cases without the barest means of subsistence. And there are every day hundreds of innocent non-combatants being murdered and slaughtered by the bombers of the Imperial Army of Japan. And the floods of the Yellow River are adding other million of civilian sufferers.
  The second development has been the gradual intensification of the sympathy of the American people for China in the present conflict. The American people have never been neutral in the Sino-Japanese war. You cannot be neutral in a situation where the right and wrong are as clear as day and night: nay, your sympathy is at least 99 per cent on the side of China and against Japan. Your sympathy is best evidenced in your generous response to all kinds of appeals for medical aid and civilian relief in China, in your enthusiastic participation in the voluntary boycott against Japanese goods, and particularly in your recent outburst of indignation against the ruthless and inhuman bombing of the civilian population in Canton and other cities. When I was traveling in Canada a few months ago, a newspaper interviewer asked me: "What good can all this sympathy do to China in the war?" I said to him: "Young man, don't underestimate the value of this overwhelming sympathy. It makes a world of difference in a modern war whether you are fighting with the conviction that the sympathy of the civilized world is with you or you are fighting in the consciousness that the whole civilized world is condemning or cursing you." And we are quite confident that the day will come, as it did come in 1917, when the immense sympathy of a great nation, under idealistic leadership, will express itself in collective action and practical statesmanship.
  The third development has been the definite formulation of an American policy toward the Far Eastern situation. In a series of widely published documents, dated from last July to March and May of this year, the great leaders of the American Government have announced to the whole world a definite and consciously thought-out policy with regard to the Far Eastern situation. The gist of that policy, as you all well know, is an unreserved condemnation of international anarchy and a determined advocacy of the maintenance of international peace and justice by the restoration of the reign of law among the nations. On several occasions, your Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, has declared: "The interest and concern of the United States in the Far East are not measured alone by the number of American citizens residing there, or by the volume of investment and trade. There is a much broader and more fundamental interest—which is, that orderly processes in international relationships be maintained." And last October, President Roosevelt said in his famous Chicago speech: "Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself, to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of other will desist from a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace." These statements represent the central points of the American Government's Far Eastern policy, which is exactly the type of positive and constructive international leadership that the peace-loving people of the whole world have been expecting, and have a right to expect, from the people and government of the most powerful and most peace-loving nation in the modern world.
  These are the things that have developed during these terrible months: first, China is rapidly bleeding to death; second, the immense sympathy of the entire American nation on the side of China is becoming more and more intensified and articulate; and thirdly, the American Government has been proclaiming to the world that there must be positive endeavors to preserve peace and restore order.
  As a representative of a suffering nation in a most unjust war, I can only express my own pious hope and the pious hope of my people that the positive and constructive policy pledged by the great leaders of the American Government may be effectively carried out before long, and that the unanimous sympathy of the American nation for my people in distress may express itself in an active support of the Government in its "positive endeavors to preserve peace." I ask for no more. And I am sure my people ask for no more.
  But I do wish to add one more word of appeal. For almost fully 12 months, my people have been making a supreme effort in resisting the invader and fighting for our threatened national existence. You and the whole world are witnesses of this supreme effort. But that supreme effort is not enough. There is a limit to the ability of human flesh and blood in fighting against much superior mechanical equipment. And there is always the danger of collapse through sheer exhaustion. It is simply irresponsible wishful thinking that China can save herself by her own military resistance alone. I am not ashamed in saying so, because even France which had had 44 years of intensive military preparation could not save herself in 1914. I am realistic enough to admit that, in order to shorten this terrible war, restore international order in Pacific area, and relieve the acute suffering of scores of millions of people, some positive international action is absolutely necessary. And if China is worth saving at all, and if there can be"positive endeavors" to preserve peace and save a suffering nation, that salvation must come before the collapse of the unified and effective central authority in China which it has taken twenty-seven long years to build up.
  The Far Eastern Situation
  The Chinese Christian Student
  Dec., 1938 and Jan., 1939. Vol. 29. No. 3. pp. 9-10.
  It is a great pleasure to have the privilege of speaking to you again this evening. In my last lecture, I have pointed out that the situation in China now was very grave. France could not save herself with forty years of military preparation. It is a wild dream that we could save our country by military force alone.
  Since 1931, I have been fighting against the enthusiasm for war. Japan has sixty years of preparation, while China has less than six. Those who have been talking of war lightly thought that Russia, England, or America would come to our help. There is no ground for believing that they will help us militarily. Russia claimed to have 1,000 planes in Siberia, seeming to be most ready to jump in. England might easily get involved because her important interests in the Far East would be at stake. America is thought to be able to assist us on account of her traditional friendship with China. But those who really understand the international situation know that the condition is exactly what the Japanese militarists have surmised; that is, neither one of the above mentioned nations would come to our assistance militarily.
  After our continual failures in wars as well as in diplomatic relations, the"paper tiger" was torn up and so there was no more dignity attached to it. Japan was clever enough to punch the "paper tiger." That is why for six years I have been writing against war. Since 1935, I saw that war was inevitable, and I changed my attitude. Even as late as last August, I tried to avoid the war or, at least, to postpone it. But once the war is declared, the only way by which China can be saved is international action. We can't easily say that Japan would be exhausted. Peffer and other pacifists and isolationists cherish this wishful thinking to meet the psychology of Americans as well as Chinese. "Let China win the war and let us do nothing." That is the psychology of the pacifists. Don't be mistaken by such an optimistic estimate!
  At present, we must be realistic. In my broadcast, I said that blood and flesh could not fight machine guns and bombs. Some thought that I was too pessimistic or I was giving an unpatriotic speech. But I want you to think in a more realistic way. If international action alone could save China, the next question is, was there any hope for such an action. After having studied the world situation, my answer is yes. My duty here is not to do propaganda work but to study the situation. I may tell you a little about the results of my study.
  There are three powers in the Pacific which could help us; namely, Russia, England and America. England is out of the question. She is tied up by the European situation and is also handicapped by her lack of preparedness. Her naval force is lagging far behind and could not even checkmate Italy. Now she has to spend $750,000,000 for rearmament.
  Russia is helpful. She has sent us three hundred planes and pilots. Two hundred more are coming. Tremendous amount of war material has been coming to our assistance from Russia. Yet Russia cannot move militarily. In spite of her strength, she cannot fight Japan for at least four reasons:
  1. In the West, there is Germany to be afraid of.
  2. Internal instability as shown by the persecutions and executions.
  3. The new regime in Russia has adopted a new foreign policy; that is, she no longer embraces the ambition of a world revolution, but now devotes herself to internal reform in order to bring about a social order. The Soviet policy is to avoid war so as not to let it interfere with her internal construction.
  4. Strategically, she has difficulty in the Far East. All Japanese communications in Korea, Manchuria and North China are directed toward Russia, so Russian positions are vulnerable at every point.
  The only country that can move at present is America. But in America there are the organized peace movement and the traditional policy of isolation. These factors were once so influential that America was prevented from joining the World War until the fourth year of fighting. America always waits until the last minute. America and England are of the same race and speak the same language, yet she waited for three years to come to England's assistance. What right do we have to expect America's immediate action? Nevertheless, there is a chance. By studying the governmental documents and authentic news, I conclude that America would move.
  Why?
  America is not easy to move because of her traditional policy of isolation and because of her pacifistic temper. England and France are helping us, but America hasn't done anything substantial. However, once America moves, it will be substantial. America is movable because of her positive and constructive international policy. This policy has been expressed successively by the Secretary of the State and the President. On July 16, 1937, Secretary Hull issued a statement of American foreign policy asking other nations for comment. On August 23, he issued another statement reiterating his foreign policy. On October 5, the President's speech in Chicago was very significant. After a careful study of all the documents and speeches, I conclude that there is a policy throughout. The only thing is to have confidence in the integrity of these men.
  What is the policy? It is the condemnation of international anarchy and the restoration of world peace. International anarchy threatened world security. Pacifists urged the withdrawal of American warships and denounced governmental protection of her nationals remaining in the war areas. But Secretary Hull declared that the interests and concern of the United States could not be measured by American residents and the volume of trade. The more fundamental interest is the orderly process of the world, the maintenance of peace through law. This is the principle.
  In a more concrete form, it is the President's speech in Chicago; that is, a positive endeavor to preserve peace by quarantine. Many think that the President has forgotten his quarantine policy. No. As the head of a leading power, he could not have declared his policy lightly. If we follow the naval policy since October, everything has been in the direction of quarantine; that is, a naval blockade or an economic blockade by a naval blockade. On January 22, the Christian Science Monitor reported the possibility of this policy. The naval bills, the moving of American navy to the middle Pacific, sending cruisers to participate in Singapore's celebration, the refusal to limit the range of naval action, etc., all indicated this policy.
  England is desiring to bring about peace with other nations in Europe. If it could be done, Chamberlain's peace policy is favorable to us. America needs the cooperation of European nations in the realization of her policy; therefore, peace in Europe is necessary in order that England and other democratic countries may have free hands to cooperate with America in the Far East. There are facts indicating that America approves the appeasing policy in Europe, such as the recognition of Austria. All these things happening in the last nine months are only preliminary steps.
  Then the last question is, when will this policy take effect. This is impossible to predict. In 1916, during the re-election of Wilson, one of the slogans was: "He kept us out of war." But one month after his election, he declared war. So no one can predict what is going to happen. The isolationists may preach their policy, but they do not know when war is coming. The German ambassador wrote to the Minister in Mexico instructing him to stir up border trouble and to befriend Japan. This might lead to action. Another incident—like the bombing of Panay—might have the same effect. Even if there is no such incident, the policy is still insistent. The policy is not to save China, but to restore world peace. The time for the coming of this policy will not be too long.
  Note
  Since this was spoken, America has granted China a 25-million dollar Import-Export Bank loan. —Ed.
  An Open Letter to the Guardian
  Harvard Guardian
  June, 1939. Vol. III. No. 6. pp. 3-4.
  To the Editors of the Harvard Guardian :
  I wish to thank you for your courtesy in asking me to send you an article to "state why the Government of China is resisting the fulfillment of these Japanese aims" as stated by Mr. Yakichiro Suma in his article entitled "New Deal in the Far East."
  It is my policy not to reply to propaganda speeches and articles by Japanese spokesmen. I have complete confidence that the common sense of the American people is sufficient safeguard against such propaganda.
  As to the reason "why the Government of China is resisting the fulfillment of these Japanese aims," may I refer you and your readers to the fact that, for 22 months, literally millions of my people have been shedding their blood and laying down their lives to resist Japanese invasion and domination? And I am sure you and your readers understand the reason why.
  I cannot, however, conclude this letter without pointing out, in passing, one of the examples of the very clever way in which these Japanese writers and speakers are twisting and distorting facts to suit their propaganda purposes. In the Guardian article, Mr. Suma said:
  "But those who believe that Japan's responsibility is axiomatic would do well to read the letter which W. H. Donald, Chiang Kai-shek's Australian adviser, wrote to a friend a few days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident near Peking. It was published in a Saturday Evening Post article last March. Donald wrote 'Now at this moment of writing we are trying to shake up a real war with Japan Before you get this the Central Government forces will be in action against the Japanese.'
  "Chiang certainly succeeded in 'shaking up a real war!'"
  Anyone who does not take the trouble to look up the Saturday Evening Post article will naturally believe that Mr. W. H. Donald wrote these words "a few days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident." Being a trained historian, I looked up the original article (by H. B. Elliston, published on March 19, 1938), which clearly stated "Donald wrote me on July 30 (1937)." Now the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, with which the Japanese Military started the present war, took place on the night of July 7, 1937—that is fully 23 days before Mr. W. H. Donald wrote the letter which Mr. Suma so much treasured.
  During these 23 days the Japanese had moved army corps after army corps into North China, had occupied large sections of the province of Hopei, and finally started full-fledged modern warfare on the 26th, 27th and 28th of July, which destroyed the Chinese city of Tientsin and the western and southern suburbs of Peiping, killing thousands and resulting in the Japanese occupation of Tientsin and Peiping on the night of July 28th.
  In short, Mr. Donald said on July 30, 1937, "Before you get this the Central Government forces will be in action against the Japanese"—this he said 23 days after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 2 days after the Japanese occupation of the historic cities of Peiping and Tientsin, 4 years after the occupation of the Province of Jehol, and almost fully 6 years after the Japanese occupation of the whole of Manchuria. And yet Mr. Suma wants to use this treasured quotation to prove to the readers of the Harvard Guardian that China started the war!
  May I request you to print this letter in full in the next issue of the Guardian , and oblige.
  Yours faithfully,
  (Signed) Hu Shih
  The Chinese Ambassador
  A New World Order Cometh!
  American Association of School Administrators Official Report
  1941. pp. 148-153.
  I am most appreciative of the honor of addressing this distinguished assembly
  of school administrators. As a university professor for twenty-one years, and as a former college president and dean, I salute you as fellow-workers in the field of education.
  I notice that the theme of this convention is threefold:
  To provide for the Common Defense
  To promote the General Welfare
  To secure the Blessings of Liberty
  And you have asked three of us from foreign lands to speak to you on international relations—on the world situation. This invitation implies a clear realization that it is the international situation that is threatening your common defense, your general welfare, and your blessings of liberty.
  I am here, not strictly as a diplomatic representative of a nation at war, but as a university professor in absentia. Therefore, I shall not burden you with a report on the state of the Chinese War of Resistance to Aggression which is now in its forty-fourth month. Nor shall I try to convey to you the gravity of the Far Eastern situation in its relationship to your national defense, to your own security, and to your own liberties. The American public is so well informed on these questions of international relations that I find it quite unnecessary to speak on them.
  I am here to present to you an interpretation of this threatening world situation and to make a forecast as to the outlook. I was uncomfortable when I heard the chairman mention the forecast I made in 1936. If my forecast today can be as prophetic as the one I made then, I am sure the world and ourselves will be the gainers.
  My interpretation of the world situation is that all the present troubles are the natural outcome of the breakdown of the post-war international order which had cost mankind over two hundred billions of dollars and eight and a half millions of human lives to bring into existence.
  My forecast of the future is that, in spite of all the present troubles, even in the midst of all the wars and the conquests of free and peace-loving peoples, there are signs which point to the rise of a new world order to take the place of the old order which has succumbed not only because of the ruthless assaults on it by the lawbreakers but also because of the inherent weakness of its own constitution.
  There is no denying that there was a kind of world order set up after the last World War. As one who lived through those days of world agony and anguish and as one who comes from a country greatly benefited by that world order, I must solemnly testify that that post-war international order was a real thing.
  It is not true that the post-war world order was entirely the creation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It stood on a much broader basis. It was supported by a host of international treaties and agreements all of a more or less idealistic kind, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the treaties of the Washington Conference, the Treaties of Locarno, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.
  It was in a real sense a world order embracing practically all nations, and not excepting the United States of America which is signatory to the Washington Conference treaties and to the Pact of Paris.
  And it was trying to solve some of the knotty problems left unsolved by the Peace Conference of Paris. The Washington Conference has helped to solve the problems of Shantung and of naval power. The Locarno Treaty sought to bring about a better relationship between France and Germany. Under this international setup, the nations of the world, great and powerful as well as small or weak nations, did enjoy a period of peace and relative disarmament.
  In short, the world order was good enough for most of the nations. It was good enough for all the peaceful and peace-loving nations of the world which were coming to look upon that period of comparative tranquillity as a good beginning for a lasting peace. But unfortunately that world order was not good enough for the trouble-makers, the evildoers, and the determined breakers of the peace. It made practically no provision to guard itself against them. Its whole structure was the product of a war-weary world which wanted peace but would do nothing effective to insure peace. It was destined to failure because there was lacking the essential element of enforcement of its own law and order by means of organized power.
  To be sure, under Articles X, XV, and XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the states members of the League have all committed themselves to the collective obligation to apply "sanctions" against any violator of the law and breaker of the peace. But a war-weary world somehow vaguely hoped that peace might be maintained without having to resort to such "sanctions."When occasions did arise calling for the enforcement of peace by applying such economic sanctions against aggressor states, the peace-loving members were cowed by the outcry that "sanctions mean war." There was neither the will nor the necessary organization and preparation for the enforcement of peace by collective force behind the law. The net result was that the post-war peace of the world could be, and was, actually, more than once threatened and broken down by the determined and lightning-like acts of some unscrupulous and fully armed aggressor.
  The first assault on this old world order was the Japanese military invasion and occupation of Manchuria in September 1931. The second was the Japanese war in Shanghai during the first month of 1932. The third assault was the Japanese invasion beyond Manchuria and beyond the Great Wall into North China in 1933. These marked the beginning of the breaking down of the postwar world order.
  China appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Washington Treaties and of the Pact of Paris. But the world was then completely unprepared to apply effective sanctions to check the aggressor state. The League Commission of Inquiry made a report on this conflict in China and recommended a settlement which was tantamount to complete compliance with Japanese wishes in Manchuria, except in name. Even that almost complete surrender to Japan was rejected by Japan which withdrew from the League in 1933. Neither the League of Nations nor the larger world order, as I have described, could do anything beyond a declaration of the principle of nonrecognition of any situation or territorial change obtained by the use of force in open violation of treaty obligations.
  These first assaults on the world order were rapidly followed, because they were unchecked, by others undertaken by aggressor states in other parts of the world. The Ethiopian War came in 1935. The Spanish War began in the summer of 1936. The fresh outbreak of Japanese aggression in China on a full-fledged scale took place in July 1937. Austria was wiped from the map in a few hours in March 1938. The Czechoslovakian crisis engaged the attention of the whole world throughout the summer months of 1938 which saw practically the last and funereal session of the Assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva, just before the famous Peace of Munich which was negotiated and signed in complete ignoring of the League. Six months after the Peace of Munich, Czechoslovakia became a German province. Less than one-half year after the extinguishment of Czechoslovakia, Poland was invaded and England and France declared war on Germany. Thus began this present phase of the European War. The breakdown of the world order was now complete. The world once more reverted to international anarchy and the "law of the jungle."
  It is, therefore, a historic fact that all the wars today, all the cruelty, misery, and suffering, all "man's inhumanity to man," which you and I are witnessing are the natural consequences of the overthrow of that resemblance of a world order which had taken $200,000,000,000 and eight and one-half million human lives to bring into being, and which prevailed for more than a full decade after the last great war. And it is no less a historical fact that that overthrow has been due to the absence of measures and means for effective enforcement of law and order against their unscrupulous violators.
  The moral of this tragic lesson should be plain to all who can read. It is this: Law and order do not mean the absence of force, but only force organized for the support or realization of a generally acknowledged beneficial object. Government by law can function only when it has some form of effectively organized force for the enforcement of order against the lawbreakers and the peace-disturbers. Enforcement is the Alpha and Omega of the law. Without this element of effective enforcement all law and order are empty words and are doomed to failure. This lesson is true in internal government and we are now learning at terrific cost that it is equally true in international order and government. That is my interpretation of the situation.
  The second part of my thesis is that a new and more promising world order is discernible. It is not yet a reality. But there are many signs which seem to herald the coming of a better day and a better world.
  Even the tragic story of the outbreak of the war in Europe eighteen months ago may be cited as the first of these encouraging signs. As you may recall, after the dismembering of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Great Britain and France suddenly realized the gravity of the situation and adopted a new, totally new, policy of pledging automatic military assistance to Poland, Romania, Greece, and later Turkey in case of the national independence of any one of them being violated and such violation being resisted with armed forces. Apparently the statesmen of these two great democratic powers, Britain and France, hoped to save the peace of Europe by this last-minute desperate undertaking of definite and almost automatic military action. Unfortunately, as you remember, it was too late. The aggressors could not believe it and were ready to risk it. So Poland was invaded, and France and Great Britain automatically declared war on Germany. We may say that the great European war was started to test the validity and sincerity of a solemn pledge, which was contained in one paragraph as you remember, by Britain and France to give automatic military aid to the victim of unwarranted aggression. I am confident that future historians will say that totalitarian aggressors met their first defeat when they had to fight a war at all. If there will ever be any chance of reviving or rebuilding a new world order nearer to our heart's desire, that revival must date its beginning back to that moment when two great powers voluntarily gave such a pledge and afterwards honored it in the face of imminent war and destruction to themselves.
  I think you will agree with me that this historical event of Great Britain and France taking up arms to fight a most desperate war in fulfilment of a solemn pledge to a weaker nation must be regarded as the first sign pointing to the rise of a new kind of international order.
  The second important sign of the times is the coming together of the great Anglo-Saxon democracies in a common struggle against totalitarian aggression. First came the voluntary but active participation in the war by all the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth. The significance of this fact is often overlooked by people who have been accustomed to thinking of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa as colonies of Great Britain. They do not realize that since the last World War, and especially under the new constitution of the British Commonwealth of 1926, these self-governing Dominions have attained the status of free and independent nationhood. The neutrality of Ireland throughout these eighteen months of the war and the narrow margin of the voting in the Parliament of the Union of South Africa on the question of participation in the war should make us appreciate all the more the significance of this participation by these members of the British Commonwealth as the free and voluntary action of self-determining and self-governing states. This gives us hope that a combination or federation of such free and democratic states can rally together of their own free will to fight against a common enemy that threatens their free and democratic way of life.
  But the more significant historic event is the wholehearted manner in which the government and people of the United States have come to the assistance of the British nations in the present war. We know that there is no commitment of any kind which binds the United States to such assistance. And we know that this all-out aid to Britain, just as the aid to China, to France before its collapse, and later to heroic Greece, is never motivated by any economic, commercial, or financial interest. Nor is it actuated by a feeling that "blood is thicker than water,"for similar aid has been and is given freely to other nations of different blood but fighting the same battles.
  What binds these Anglo-Saxon democracies together in the present fight is the realization and the conviction that their common civilization, their ways of life, their social, political, religious, and cultural institutions are threatened and menaced by an aggressive force inspired by a philosophy of force. Their common tie is their common defense of their historic democratic institutions from the conquest and domination by that force and by that philosophy of force. It is a bond that requires no treaty obligation or diplomatic commitment. It is a cause that transcends economic and commercial interests and even national and racial differences. I cannot help viewing this great movement of nationwide American aid to Great Britain as another sure sign pointing to the coming of a new world and a new world order.
  I have cited only two concrete facts as sure signs heralding the coming of a new world order: first, the entrance of Great Britain and France into the present world war in fulfilment of a solemn pledge of automatic military assistance to a victim of aggression, and second, the coming together of all the Anglo-Saxon democracies in a common fight against a common enemy who threatens the conquest and destruction of democratic civilization. I said in the beginning that the old world order broke down because it made no provision for checking or curbing the evildoers and lawbreakers, and because there was neither the will nor the preparation on the part of the nations to check and curb the aggressors and to enforce peace, but these few signs I have mentioned point to a new, a fundamental change apparently in the world. To me these signs and events are the most cheering beacon lights in a world of darkness. Dimly but unmistakably I envisage a new world after this terrible war—a world wherein the naval power of all the aggressor states will have been destroyed; wherein all the sea power will be in the hands of free and democratic nations whose powerful navies will become the most natural and most effective international police force for a new international order; wherein the law and order among the nations will be effectively enforced by a sufficient amount of organized force operating in the interest of human decency and orderly relationships; wherein aggressive wars shall be made impossible because international legislations for economic and military sanctions against all possible violations of peace and order will have been made so clear and so unmistakable that no evasion of responsibility for war and for the enforcement of peace will be possible.
  Such is the new world order that I see coming in the midst of all this turmoil.
  Our Honorable Enemy
  China at War
  Jan., 1942. Vol. VIII. No. 1. pp. 11-13.
  Three days ago, the President of the United States sent to Congress a great document setting forth the long record of Japanese-American relations of the last 80 years, and in particular of the last nine months, "the record for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust."
  This record will make all of us, Chinese and Americans, better understand the character of our common enemy, Japan.
  Tonight, I wish to take a few minutes to add a historical note. I want to speak on Japan in the light of history.
  In order to understand Japan and her recent record of aggressive expansion, we must remember the fundamental historical fact that Japan has been governed by a militaristic caste for the last 1,200 years, and especially for the last 300 years, and was at the height of a fully developed militant feudalism when Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors in 1853.
  This historical Japan has always been totalitarian in political organization, militaristic in training and imperialistic in aspiration.
  Sir George Sansom, the most sympathetic authority on Japanese history, has pointed out these feudalistic totalitarian features in a recent article:
  From 1615 or thereabouts, Japan was ruled by a feudal oligarchy which anticipated in many respects the methods of government used by modern totalitarian states. The distinguishing features were there—the rule of a self-constituted elite, the disabilities imposed upon certain classes, the restriction of personal liberty, the sumptuary laws, the monopolies, the censorship, the secret police and the doctrine that the individual exists for the State. When in 1868 this regime was overthrown it was replaced not by a popular government, but by a powerful bureaucracy whichperpetuated the essential features of totalitarianism.
  It is this historical totalitarian tradition which has readily linked Japan with the totalitarian states of present day Europe. In the same article, Sir George Sansom quotes Mr. Shiratori, formerly Japanese Ambassador to Rome, who wrote in 1938:
  The country (Japan) is fast reverting to totalitarianism, which has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past 30 centuries It makes our hearts warm to see ideas that have influenced our race for centuries in the past embodied in the system of modern states of Europe.
  From these words from one of the authors and signers of the Tripartite Axis Pact, we can understand it is no mere historical accident that Japan readily and willingly becomes a partner of the European Axis and regards that partnership as"the immutable policy of the Empire."
  The same historical tradition also explains the ease and rapidity with which Japan has transformed herself into a first class militaristic power. It explains one of the greatest historical puzzles. The puzzle is why, of all the non-European nations, Japan alone has been successful in adopting and mastering the martial and militaristic aspects of Western civilization. Neither China nor India nor Persia nor Korea nor Annam nor Siam could do it. Japan alone was best qualified to undertake this rapid militarization because her ruling class, the daimyo and samurai , had been educated, trained and imbued in the militaristic tradition, and because what a ruling class does is always eagerly emulated by the whole nation. So it was again no mere historical accident that Japan of all the non-European nations alone succeeded in becoming one of the greatest military powers within the short space of a few decades.
  And lastly, the same historical tradition also explains Japan's policy of imperialistic expansion. When the famous Tanaka Memorial was first published in China in 1931, the Japanese vigorously denied its authenticity, and the outside world was skeptic about its gigantic program of continental expansion and world conquest. But the events of the last ten years have proved beyond any doubt that that seemingly fantastic program truly represents the imperialistic ambition of the policy-makers of Japan.
  For us in China and on the Asiatic continent in general, it is unnecessary to go to the Tanaka Memorial for documentation of the imperialistic tradition of Japan. World conquest has been the national ideal of Japan for all these 350 years.
  Exactly 351 years ago, in 1590, Hideyoshi, the great military hero of medieval Japan, sent letters to Korea, China, the Philippines, the Liuchiu Islands and India to inform them that he was planning to embark on a program to conquer the Asiatic continent and the islands. I quote a few sentences from his letter to the Kings of Korea:
  Hideyoshi, the Supreme Imperial Advisor of the Emperor of Japan, hereby addresses His Excellency the King of Korea—

  Although I was born to a family of low rank, my mother conceived me immediately after she had dreamed that the Sun had entered into her bosom. A physiognomist interpreted this dream and predicted that I was destined to extend my authority to all parts of the world where the sun shines. When I came to manhood, my benevolent rule would be admired by nations in every direction. People within the four seas would all come under my influence and power. Because I was born with great destiny, which was revealed by this omen, those who have fostered feelings of enmity and opposition have been crushed and destroyed. Whenever and against whomever I have waged war, the victory has always been mine. The lands and districts invaded by me have always been conquered. Now our empire has entered upon a period of peace and prosperity—I am not willing to spend the remaining years of my life in the land of my birth. According to my idea, the nation that I would create should include them all. In starting my conquest, I planned that our forces should proceed to China and compel the people there to adopt our customs and manners. Then that vast country, consisting of more than four hundred provinces, would enjoy our imperial protection and benevolence for millions of years to come.—You, King of Korea, are hereby instructed to join us at the head of all your fighting men.
  Hideyoshi mobilized an army of 305,000 men and sent that huge force across the sea to invade Korea in 1592. This war of invasion lasted seven years and ended only after the death of Hideyoshi. At the outset of his campaign, Hideyoshi worked out a timetable which reminds us of the timetables of modern conquerors. According to his timetable, his army was to conquer Korea before the end of May 1592 and to occupy Peking, the capital of China, before the end of the year. By 1593 the Imperial Regent would proceed to Peking to assume the title of the Imperial Regent of China. By 1594 the Japanese Imperial Court would be removed to Peking where the Emperor would be enthroned as the Emperor of the newly created empire. When China, Korea and Japan were thus united into the first unit of the great Asiatic Empire, Hideyoshi would establish himself at Ningpo, China (the birthplace of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek). After that, his military leaders would proceed to carry the military campaign into India and other Asiatic countries.
  The timetable of Hideyoshi was not carried out, but the man became the idol and ideal of the Japanese nation all these 350 years. Only two days ago, you read a letter of Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy, written on January 24, 1941, in which he said that he would not be content merely to capture Guam and the Philippines, and to occupy Hawaii and San Francisco, and that he was looking forward to dictating peace to the United States in the White House in Washington. This is no joke. It is an authentic echo of the spirit of Hideyoshi.
  In the words of General Chiang Kai-shek to your great President on December 9, "to our now common battle we offer all we are and all we have to stand with you until the Pacific and the world are freed from the curse of brute force and endless perfidy."
  Speech Before the Economic Club of New York
  Cornell Papers
  Mar. 16, 1942.