第八十四章《胡适英文论著：中国外交》（1）

  第八十四章《胡适英文论著：中国外交》（1）

  Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations?
  International Conciliation: Special Bulletin
  New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1916. 15 pages.
  Ⅰ

  The question "Is there a substitute for force in international relations" implies a serious ambiguity which, if not clearly understood at the outset, will greatly hamper our understanding of the real issue involved. Those who raise this question really mean by "force," not force qua force, but only the frequent and unrestrained resort to armed force for settlement of international disputes. But the way in which the question is put not only begs the question from a logical standpoint, but also seriously obscures the real meaning intended by the questioner. For the wording"a substitute for force" seems to suggest that the substitute to be sought is to be antithetically opposed to force—is to be devoid of force. Such a substitute there is none. For, in the words of Mr. John A. Hobson, "there is no display of moral force in any act of human conduct which does not make some use of physical force as its instrument."
  This point will become clear if we consider a doctrine which is commonly supposed to be diametrically opposed to force, namely, the doctrine of non-resistance. When this doctrine is advocated, it is very often confronted by two sets of questions. Its advocate is asked either, "What would you do if you saw your wife or your sister attacked by a criminal?" or, "Did not Christ himself use force when he drove the venders and moneychangers out of the temple of God?"It is regrettable that the zeal of the non-resister often makes him blind to the truth underlying these questions. The first question implies that the problem of force cannot be solved by any sweeping condemnation of its use, but must be considered in relation to the specific and concrete circumstances which demand the application or the non-application of force. The second question points clearly to the fact that the Christian command "Resist not evil" does not necessarily mean a condemnation of force as such. It seems that the doctrine of non-resistance may be interpreted as another way of saying "Vengeance belongs to God." The question is not, whether force is condemnable or justifiable, but, whether the administering of justice should be done by the interested parties themselves or by some higher and impartial power.
  In recent discussions on this doctrine, it has been often pointed out that this principle implies no total denial of force, but only a firm belief that the attitude of passivity is capable of leading the offender or the criminal into repentance and goodness. It is this belief which has led some writers to call this doctrine that of "super-resistance" or "effective resistance." "The non-resistance doctrine,"says Professor John Dewey, "can only mean that given certain conditions, passive resistance is a more effective means of resistance than overt resistance would be."
  I have indulged at some length in discussing the doctrine of non-resistance, because I believe that much of the vagueness and confusion in current discussion of international problems has been due to a misunderstanding of the real nature and place of force in human society. The point I wish to make clear by the foregoing discussion is that it is futile to look for an international policy which shall not involve a use of force; that even the so-called doctrine of non-resistance is not really a condemnation of force as such; and that the search for a "substitute for force" can only mean seeking a substitute for the most crude form and most wasteful use of force.
  Ⅱ

  What is wrong with the international situation is not that force prevails, but that force does not prevail. In the present war, we are witnessing the most stupendous manifestation of force that has ever happened in human history. And yet what has this tremendous display of force so far accomplished? Has the twenty-one months' world war resulted in more than a deadlock on all battle-fronts? Will all the unprecedentedly great sacrifices of lives and property, all defeat and victory, be able to settle any of the questions which somehow drove the nations into this war two years ago? The truth is that the nations have not yet learned how to make force really count for something in international relations. They have only been lavishing their available forces in a most wasteful manner with the least returns.
  Why has force of such an unprecedented magnitude yet been unable to secure peace and order, to achieve the ends for which such force was manifestly intended? Because force has not been efficiently used, because it has been wastefully applied. Force cannot prevail, if it is unorganized, unregulated and undirected. Under existing conditions, force is employed to resist force, or, more correctly speaking, force is so employed as to create for itself hosts of rival forces. The result has been a mutual cancelment of force: both the acting force and that acted upon are wasted in this process of mutual resistance and annulment.
  Our problem, therefore, is not to condemn force in toto , nor yet to seek for any substitute-policy which will involve no use of force, but to find a way to make force actually prevail, that is, to avoid the wasteful use of it which leads nowhere but to self-exhaustion and annihilation. The solution of our problem lies in the organizing of the existing forces of the nations in such a manner as to minimize resistance or friction and to insure maximum economy and efficiency in their expenditure.
  The experience of mankind in gradually passing from the lawless state of the savages into the civilized state of government by law, is the best illustration of the way in which isolated and conflicting forces or energies are gradually organized for the economical and efficient direction of human activities. "Law,"says Professor Dewey, "is a statement of the conditions of the organization of energies which, when unorganized, would conflict and result in violence—that is, destruction or waste." The reign of law simply means a state of conditions where our conduct is governed by, to use a recent expression of President Wilson,"a prescribed course of duty and respect for the rights of others which will check any selfish passion of our own, as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs." It is this "statement" or "prescription" of the rules of conduct that enables men to avoid the wasteful expenditure of force which would necessarily result if the activities and energies of men were allowed to run wild and clash with one another.
  Unfortunately, what mankind has at last learned to practice within the nations themselves, has not yet to any considerable extent found its way into the realm of international dealings. What is termed international law to-day is only a little way in advance of what may be called the stage of regulated dueling. The few provisions for pacific settlement of international disputes have not been extensively applied by the nations, and fourteen years' reign of international law under the Hague Conventions has not only failed to avert the present world calamity, but also failed to effectively regulate the conduct of war in the relations both between the belligerents themselves and between belligerents and neutrals.
  Since the outbreak of the present war, however, there has developed, especially in the English-speaking world, a fairly wide recognition of the fact that the only way to safeguard civilization from repeating any such calamity lies in some international arrangement or organization for pacific and judicial settlement of disputes. Such opinion has found exponents not only in many of the publicists who have given thought to the international situation, but also in such official representatives of powerful states as Premier Asquith and President Wilson. The latter, in his speech before the League to Enforce Peace, declared his desire for "a universal association of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world."In short, many there are who have come to realize that the failure to organize the conflicting forces of the nations for some definite common purposes has been the fundamental cause of international strife, insecurity and war; and they have also realized that such stupendous waste of energy, vitality and resources as we witness to-day, cannot be prevented until there is found some method of direction and organization for a less wasteful and therefore more efficient expenditure of the force of the nations.
  Ⅲ

  We have so far arrived at the conclusion that in order to make force work effectively in achieving the contemplated ends of peace and security, we must seek to convert the now isolated and conflicting energies of the nations into some organized form—into some form of international association under a prescribed course of reciprocal duties and rights. We may now consider the directions in which the future task of organizing the forces of nations may possibly and profitably proceed. Such a discussion can best be undertaken by reference to the present status and defects of the law of nations.
  First, it seems that in the coming international arrangement, the scope of the category of justiciable disputes should be greatly enlarged. At present, only"disputes of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on points of fact," are justiciable or arbitrable. This naturally excludes from the process of juridical settlement many of the disputes which are most likely to lead the nations into war. Furthermore, each nation is at liberty to declare "that in its opinion the dispute does not belong to the category of disputes which can be submitted to compulsory arbitration." Thus an insult to a flag may be a question of honor, and a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela may be a matter of vital interest to the United States.
  It seems therefore necessary to the permanent interest of the world to gradually enlarge the category of justiciable disputes so that many of the cases now beyond the reach of international law may be made either arbitrable or at least subject to inquiry and conciliation by an international commission. In this connection, it is encouraging to note that the treaties negotiated by ex-Secretary of State Bryan with the several powers on the subject of an international commission of inquiry, provide that "all disputes between the contracting parties, of every nature whatever, which diplomacy shall fail to adjust, shall be submitted for investigation and report to an International Commission." It is to be hoped that this principle will find wider application in international law than it has hithertofore received. Without some such extension of jurisdiction, the law of nations can only "strain at a gnat and swallow a camel."
  In the second place, the charge has often been made that international law is itself imperfect and uncertain, and does not cover the needs of the times. One illustration is the fact that international law has not been able to keep pace with the rapid increase of new weapons of warfare such as are being used in the present war. It is also silent on such important subjects as the definition of"spheres of influence" by certain powers in the "backward" states, or the definition of the so-called "war zones" in neutral territory by belligerents, neither of whom the suffering neutral is in a position to resist. It seems therefore evident that, in order that international law may guard itself against archaism and against evasion through its own loopholes, there must be frequent periodical revision and codification of the law, or, better still, some form of international legislature which shall periodically meet and progressively extend the law over fields which it does not now cover.
  In the third place, the most serious weakness of international law is that it has no effective means of enforcement. Without enforcement, which Professor Roscoe Pound calls "the life of law," international law is not much more than a mere scrap of paper. Under existing conditions, a nation might refuse to submit a justiciable case to arbitration, or it might decline to accept or carry out an arbitral award which went against its interests. In case of unarbitrable disputes, a nation might refuse to submit to inquiry; it might actively prepare for eventual resort to arms during the prescribed period; or it might refuse a pacific settlement after the Commission has made its report. Any one of these recalcitrant acts will suffice to render a reign of law impossible.
  To remedy this defect of the existing law of nations, it has been proposed that some kind of sanction should be provided in the form of a concerted use of the economic and military forces of the signatory powers against any transgressor of the law. There are certain obvious advantages in such an international organization of force. In the first place, it will avoid unnecessary duplication and waste. It is the indispensable condition of a general reduction of armaments: it will free the nations from the alleged necessity of each so arming itself as to be stronger than every other. Secondly, it will minimize the use of force. Where the object of employing force is clearly defined and understood, where, as some writer has put it, "all the cards are on the table," where a breach of public law carries with it a possibility of public punishment, there we have the beginning of a reliable structure to safeguard civilization from sudden and periodic breakdown. Thirdly, the combining of the forces of the nations for the enforcement of public law and maintenance of peace will perhaps have an educative value in inculcating the sentiments of international solidarity and good-will. At least it will tend to liberate the nations from those artificial barriers and prejudices which now prevail.
  Ⅳ

  But, while readily admitting the advantages of an effective sanction of international law, we must not ignore the indispensable preliminary conditions without which no international organization can ever hope to succeed. One of these conditions is that there must be a sufficiently strong body of interests which demand the enforcement of the law. At present, there are a number of practical interests of an international nature. Of these we may mention commerce, finance, investment, communication, transportation, the freedom of the high seas, immigration and the exchange of labor. All these interests have long transcended national lines and have become what has been termed "trans-national" in character. National defence, too, has become a "trans-national" problem. No nation can now rely on its own isolated force for safety and for satisfaction of injured interests, violated honor and outraged justice. Interests of such an international or trans-national nature need only to be made articulate and conscious of their own needs in order to become a firm foundation on which to build an effective international structure.
  But such interests alone are not sufficient. Government by law has not been created by private interests alone, but has come about as a result of many centuries of conscious thought and deliberation, of the development of political and legal philosophy. Likewise, international government by law and combined force cannot arise from practical interests and inarticulate needs alone. There must be a radical change of the attitude of nations towards one another: there must be a new political philosophy and a new jurisprudence. First, we must have a new theory of the sovereignty of the state. Instead of the old theory that sovereignty consists in freedom from external juridical responsibility, we shall teach that the sovereignty of a state is a right the existence and validity of which entirely depend upon a tacit or explicit recognition and respect on the part of the other nations. As a right valid only by reciprocal understanding and recognition, the sovereignty of the state is not impaired but strengthened by becoming a member of a society of sovereignties.
  We must also, in this revolution in international thinking, gradually modify our nationalism. Instead of "Right or wrong, my country," we must regard the state as merely one of the many groups to which the individual belongs and which, to use the words of Professor Harold Laski, must "compete for his allegiance just like his church or race or trade union, and when conflict arises the choice of the individual must be made on moral grounds." Instead of exalting the nation-state "über Alles ," we must realize that the state is only a means to the well-being and free development of the individuals that compose it; and that whatever improvement of world-organization tends to enhance the safety of the state from external threats of aggression and destruction, is entitled to the devotion and support of every patriotic citizen.
  Furthermore, there is needed a new conception of the nature, place and function of force in human society. While admitting the necessity and value of force as a means to a desired and desirable end—thus avoiding the one-sided condemnation of force in toto —we must realize that, if the forces of the world are not co-ordinated to a definite common purpose but are allowed to rival one another for superiority in magnitude and deadliness, then force cannot be used for productive ends and is of necessity squandered in the endless process of outpowering the rival forces. In order to avoid this resultant waste and sterility and in order to insure a maximum economy and efficiency, it is necessary to organize and direct the rival forces, not towards mutual resistance and therefore mutual cancelment, but towards the co-operative achievement of some positive ends of common interest. Force cannot be rationalized until its use is socialized or internationalized. Not until such a conception of force shall be widely popularized and intelligently applied to international as well as to national life, can there be a really reliable substitute for the present wasteful and destructive employment of force in international relations.
  And, lastly, those who desire and work for a better international order will have constantly to fight against that inveterate habit of thinking which may be termed "historical fatalism." They are frequently reminded that deliberate planning and conscious effort have little or no place in determining the course and destiny of mankind. "The march of events rules and overrules human action,"—these memorable words of McKinley are frequently quoted in justification of groping and muddling in international affairs. Such determinism in political thinking practical idealism must repudiate and seek to replace. That the march of events rules and overrules human action is a frank declaration of the bankruptcy of statesmanship and human intelligence. It might find some justification in those olden times when one part of the world lived in complete isolation and ignorance of the other parts. But in these days when rapid transportation and almost instantaneous diffusion of intelligence have actually placed the entire earth "under our immediate notice, acquaintance and influence," in these days when we actually have at our command the equipment for the effective diagnosis and control of the international situation, it is only intellectual laziness and senility that still seeks to explain away political blunders by the fatalistic deus ex machina . Never before has traditional statesmanship—the statesmanship of drifting along with the tide of time and events—wrought so much devastation and suffering to the world. Never before has the possibility of conscious planning and control of international relations appeared so well within the power of human intelligence and resourcefulness. Shall we, then, again permit our statesmen to muddle through and be hurled along by "the march of events"—ever comforting ourselves with the thought: "After us, the millennium?"
  The Pacific Changes Color
  The Chinese Mercury
  Jan., 1937. Vol. 1. No. 1. pp. 44-45.
  With Japan, Russia and China as main actors, the Pacific stage is undergoing a process of change.
  After the World War, until September 18, 1931, when Japan captured Manchuria, Japan's supremacy in the Far East was an established fact. For seven years, from 1914 to 1921, Japan ruled the Far East almost without a rival. In 1915 she forced on China the notorious "Twenty One Demands." Four years later, in 1919, despite the vigorous protest of the Chinese, she was given by the Allied Powers the right of free disposition of the former German concessions in Shantung. The Washington Conference was called to check the flood of Japan's preponderate power in the Far East, but achieved a negative result. During the first ten years after the conclusion of the Washington Treaties in 1921 Japan's power reached a new peak.
  Since 1931, however, there has been a shift of power in the Pacific, and Japan's supremacy no longer remains an undisputable fact. As the result of Japan's violence committed in Manchuria, new forces of great import have emerged.
  First, Russia has become a first-rate Power in the Far East. Since 1931 the Soviet Union has brought up a huge army estimated at between 300,000 and 500,000 well trained and equipped men for defense work in the Far East. She has developed the strongest air force in the world, her air fleet figured at more than 7,000. Her submarines and destroyers stationed in the Pacific are said to have quintupled. Finally, she has constructed 7,000 miles of new railways along the Mongolian and Siberian borders, and has double-tracked 3,000 miles of railways already existing.
  Secondly, the rearmament of the non-Asiatic nations bordering the Pacific or having possessions there, is being rapidly pushed forward. The construction of the British naval base at Singapore was resumed after the Sino-Japanese war at Shanghai early in 1932, and is drawing to its completion. New Zealand and Australia, having never dreamed of the necessity of arming, are now vigorously mapping out their schemes of coastal defense. Each recruits an enlarged militia, manufactures its own planes, and extracts gasoline from coal and shale. This chain of nations newly armed or rearmed constitutes another new force in the Far East. Also, it is the net result of Japan's aggression in Manchuria.
  Thirdly, there is the revival of China, which is even more important than the above two forces. Under the National Government at Nanking, the country has been united. National reconstruction has made headway in many directions. Generally it may be grouped under the following three phases:
  1.Improved physical unity of the country as expressed in the increased network of railroads, large-scale construction of highways and the opening of various air routes.
  2.Improvement of the physical well-being of the people through large rural reconstruction projects, improvement of crops, extension of hahitation work, irrigation of the large waterless hinterland, repairing of dikes and dredging of rivers in order to lessen the dangers of floods and famines.
  3.Extension of educational and cultural work, particularly the introduction of obligatory elementary education for each child for a period of one year, and the adoption in 1921 of one widely-spoken dialect as the national language to be used in all schools replacing the classical written language, which was not understood by the masses.
  Under the present circumstances a war with Japan is inevitable as China can find no other way out for her existence. For twenty-five years I had been a pacifist, and my friendship for Japan had withstood the seizure of Manchuria and Japan's other warlike acts. Since June 10, 1935, I have been converted into a champion for armed resistance. That was the day the Japanese army compelled the Chinese government to order the Chinese people to cease expressing dissatisfaction with Japanese policies toward China.
  But before dealing Japan an effective blow, China must bend every effort to build up a strong, unified state. Indeed, a strong unified China, once built up, will be the chief stabilizing power of the Far East.
  The Changing Balance of Forces in the Pacific
  Foreign Affairs
  Jan., 1937. Vol. 15. No. 2. pp. 254-259.
  Broadly speaking, there are only two views of the Far Eastern situation.
  There is the view of those who regard it as completely beyond any peaceful remedy. They are the defeatists. But there are still a few optimists who hold the view that recent changes in the balance of power in the Pacific may yet provide far-sighted and constructive statesmanship with an opportunity of devising some kind of peaceful adjustment. I shall try to state in the following pages the reasons for my being one of these optimistic few.
  Many believe that there is no longer any balance of power in the Far East, that there is only the supremacy of one nation—Japan. They believe that the semblance of international equilibrium and order which obtained during the period of the Washington Treaties (1921-31) was ruthlessly and irrevocably destroyed by the acts of Japan beginning in September 1931. They believe that where one Power is in a position of such absolute preponderance, and where that Power happens to be intoxicated with the successes it has met with in carrying through an apparently irresistible program of militaristic expansion, there cannot be any remedy or modification of the situation without an international war.
  From such a major premise only defeatist conclusions can be drawn: either the Powers of Europe and America must acknowledge their helplessness in this situation, and each of them plan to withdraw the commercial and financial interests of its nationals from the Far East in order to avoid a possible conflict; or they must appease the predominant Power by sacrificing all principles of international justice and the sanctity of treaty obligations in order to retain a minimum share in the spoils; or each must go on with its military and naval preparations in anticipation of an inevitable clash in the not-too-distant future.
  Such seemed to be the state of mind prevailing at the round table discussions of the Institute of Pacific Relations in which I participated last summer. Shortly after that meeting, a liberal journal of opinion in the United States advocated editorially that all American merchants and firms trading in China should be withdrawn from that country and that the American Government should undertake to compensate their losses out of the money saved from scrapping the American navy. I need not mention the other organs of opinion which advocate creating a big navy and a big air force as the only sort of language which Japan can understand. I do not propose to comment on such views. I only wish to point out that there is this defeatist attitude toward the international situation in the Pacific. To build a big navy without backing it with a constructive policy is defeatism. To advocate the abandonment of the principle of non-recognition—the only surviving reminder of the sanctity of a set of great and idealistic treaties—is defeatism. And the mere pious wish to avoid a clash by scrapping the American navy and abandoning a continent of commerce and investment is no less defeatism.
  I venture to suggest that this defeatism in all its forms is based upon an erroneous understanding of the present situation in the Pacific area. It is erroneous today to think of that situation as one of Japanese supremacy unmitigated by any changes in the balance of forces. Such changes have been taking place since 1931.
  The plain historical truth is this: "Japan's supremacy in the Far East" was a fact in the period of seventeen years from 1914 to 1931; but since 1931 it no longer has been a fact.
  It is unnecessary to recount how at the outbreak of the World War in 1914 the semblance of a balance of power which had prevailed since the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 completely broke down. Great Britain, Russia and France were engaged in a life and death struggle in Europe. The Far East was left in the hands of Britain's ally, Japan, who proceeded to wipe out all German possessions and influence on the Chinese coast and in the Pacific Ocean. For seven years, from 1914 to 1921, Japan ruled the Western Pacific almost without a rival. This supremacy was evidenced by Japan's "Twenty-one Demands" on China in 1915. It was still more clearly evidenced at the Peace Conference in 1919 when the victorious Allies, against the nationwide protests of the Chinese people and against a worldwide sentiment for the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, conceded to Japan the right of free disposition of the former German concessions in Shantung.
  The Washington Conference was called to readjust the problems of naval disarmament and the Pacific problems left unsolved by the Paris Peace Conference. It had a direct bearing on the Pacific situation in four ways. First, the question of Shantung was amicably settled between China and Japan. Secondly, the eight signatory Powers (other than China) of the Nine-Power Treaty pledged themselves "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; [and] to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States." Thirdly, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not renewed and its place was taken by the Four-Power Treaty. Fourthly, the ratio 5-5-3 was adopted for the naval strengths of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, respectively.
  While it is true that the Washington Treaties aimed at the establishment of a set of new checks and balances on Japan's preponderate power in the Far East, it is no less true that the supremacy of Japan was never in fact curtailed by the actions taken at Washington. On the contrary, Japanese power in the Pacific was never greater than during those first ten years after the Washington Treaties(1921-31). The real result of the Conference was to rectify some of the most pressing troubles between China and Japan, remove much of the tension between Japan and the other naval Powers, and thereby secure Japan's preponderate position in the Western Pacific by practically legalizing it.
  There is such a thing as power becoming greatest when it is made innocuous. The best example is the supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Japan's position in the family of nations was the highest when she abided by the results of the Washington Conference and remained one of the Big Four in the League of Nations. Since she began to abuse that power in 1931, and particularly since she withdrew from the League in 1933, she has not again attained her former heights of power and prestige.
  Thus we may say that "the supremacy of Japan in the Far East" was not only true of the period of the World War and the years immediately following its conclusion, but also true of the ten years after the Washington Conference. While the League Covenant and the Washington Treaties and the Pact of Paris prevailed there was no balance of power in the Pacific. There was only a New World Order, or at least the semblance of it, within which Japan was tacitly acknowledged by all as the undisputed leader in the Far East and in the Western Pacific.
  But since September 18, 1931, that is to say, since Japan's militarists started their aggressive campaigns in Manchuria, in Shanghai, and in North China—what a tremendous change has taken place! By those acts of aggression, Japan threw into the discard the whole postwar machinery of peace. Japanese power ran wild. It upset not merely the East, but the entire world. It destroyed that semblance of international order which alone had legalized and tacitly protected Japan's supremacy.
  What are the new factors brought forth since 1931 as a result, at least in part, of Japan's violent action?
  In the first place, Soviet Russia has come back to the Pacific as a first-rate military Power. At the time of the Washington Conference, she had not yet been recognized by the other Powers. She was neither a participant in the Conference nor a signatory to the Washington Treaties. But since 1931 the Soviet Union has brought to the Far East a huge armed force estimated to include between 300,000 and 500,000 finely trained and well equipped men. She is developing one of the greatest air forces in the world. Since 1931, her submarine and destroyer fleet in the Pacific is reported to have quintupled and the coast guard fleet to have increased elevenfold. In these years she has constructed about 7,000 miles of new railways along the Mongolian and Siberian borders, and 3,000 miles have been double-tracked. And behind all these there has taken place the most remarkable progress in industrialization, not only in European Russia but also in the Soviet Far East.
  In other words, Russia has now definitely returned to the Pacific area as a fully armed Power. She comes, too, possessed of new and vast industrial resources. Japan must now reckon with her more than ever as a factor in the Pacific scene.
  The second new factor is the rapid rearmament of all the non-Asiatic nations bordering the Pacific or having possessions there. A continuous ring extends from the Aleutian Islands to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies . We read the other day that for the month of July 1936, the Dutch Indies were the heaviest buyers of American ammunition. The construction of the British naval base at Singapore, after being suspended for a time, was vigorously resumed after the fighting at Shanghai early in 1932. This most gigantic naval base in the world is now practically completed. New Zealand and Australia, the two paradises of the Southern Pacific Ocean which had never dreamed of the necessity of arming, are now seriously working out their own schemes of coastal defense. Each is recruiting an enlarged militia, manufacturing its own planes, and laboriously extracting gasoline from coal and shale. Recently when I was in Winnipeg I read in the Free Press that Canada, too, is going to have a new navy. And the United States is constructing new armaments and fortifications from the Philippines to Alaska, and undertaking a heavy naval building program.
  This ring of nations newly armed or rearmed must be considered a new factor produced since 1931 by Japan's actions.
  Last but not least we must note the rapid rise of the national state of China. The unification of China under the National Government at Nanking is the outcome of Japan's aggression. In the dark shadows of national humiliation, a unified Chinese state is taking form.
  During the first two years following Japan's aggression in Manchuria, Japanese spokesmen everywhere declared that China was not an organized modern state and should not be accorded the full rights and privileges which such states enjoy. In the last three years such pleadings have ceased. In their place we constantly hear statements from Japanese militarists to the effect that the Empire of Japan cannot co-exist with Chiang Kai-shek's government. "Shall the Empire surrender to him? Or shall it crush him?" Such were the alternatives stated recently by General Tada. Long before the outside world became aware of it, the shrewd eyes of the Japanese military had begun to see the growth of a nationalistic China and perceived that it would have an increasing power of resistance to external aggression.
  This new factor in the Pacific scene may indeed turn out to be the most important of the three which I have enumerated. For, as John Hay knew, an independent and strong China is necessary not only for the maintenance of the Open Door but also for the stability and peace of the Far East. For over thirty years China failed to live up to Hay's expectations. Now she is earnestly endeavoring to qualify herself as one of the stabilizing forces in Asia.
  Such are the new factors which now are entering into the balance of forces in the Pacific and changing that balance so that Japan, though she still plays a mighty role, is no longer supreme.
  Evidently if these new factors are not properly organized they may lead towards a terrible international conflagration. It might begin with a war forced on China by Japan's continued aggression, and gradually it might involve Soviet Russia, Great Britain and ultimately the United States. In the modern world war is as truly "indivisible" as peace. No nation bordering on the Pacific, or interested in its fate, can hope to escape being involved in any major Pacific conflict.
  But wise statesmen may also discern in this changing balance of power new possibilities for a peaceful adjustment of the Pacific world. They may now discover a way to create a regional peace machinery which has as participants the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire (with all its Pacific members), as well, of course, as Japan and China. What is certain is that the alternative to such a peaceful collective arrangement will be another world conflagration the magnitude and the horror of which will be beyond anything we now envisage in the boldest stretch of our imagination.
  The Issues Behind the Far Eastern Conflict
  Pamphlet
  New York: China Institute in America, 1937. 8 pages.
  In my humble opinion, the real issues behind the present conflict in the Far East are two: first, the clash of Japanese imperialism with the legitimate aspirations of Chinese nationalism; and secondly, the conflict of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order.
  The primary issue behind all the fighting and slaughtering and bombing, which you read every day during the last three months, is Chinese nationalism driven into a desperate resistance against an external aggression which apparently knows no limit.
  Nationalism is a new word in the Chinese dictionary, but national consciousness has never been absent in Chinese history. It has its firm foundation in the racial, cultural and historical unity of her vast population. It always asserted itself whenever China came into contact with a foreign race or culture, especially in those historic periods when she was conquered by a foreign invasion or dominated by an alien civilization. It was Chinese national consciousness that gradually revolted against Buddhism as an alien religion, and finally killed it. It was Chinese nationalism that overthrew the Mongol Empire and drove the Mongols beyond the deserts. It was Chinese nationalism1 which brought forth the numerous anti-Manchu secret societies and open revolts in the 18th and 19th centuries, and which finally overthrew the Manchu monarchy twenty-six years ago.
  Frankly and truthfully speaking, what Japanese apologists loudly advertise to the world as "anti-Japanese sentiments and acts in China" is simply Chinese nationalism resenting and resisting the real and undeniable aggressions of a foreign power, Japan. And in so far as the aggressions are real, Chinese resistance is justifiable and justified. That is why China is having the sympathy of almost the entire world on her side during this war.
  In each and every case of outburst of anti-Japanese feeling or anti-Japanese boycott there was invariably a long series of Japanese aggressions preceding it. It was the presentation of the famous 21 Demands with a threat of war that was responsible for the anti-Japanese boycotts of 1915. It was the Japanese refusal to restore Shantung to China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that was responsible for the birth of a nationwide Student Movement in China, which revived the anti-Japanese boycotts and which had great influence in contributing to the success of the Nationalist Revolution of 1925-1927.
  And, of course, it was the six long years of unwarranted, unlimited and insatiable Japanese invasions and aggressions involving a total loss of Chinese territory as large as a fifth of the Continent of Europe and carrying with them the most humiliating intrigues and insults which no human patience could long forebear,—it was these six years of most bitter and acute suffering of my people that is now bursting, boiling and burning behind this undeclared war in China.
  The issue, therefore, is pure and simple: It is Chinese nationalism resisting Japanese invasion; it is the Chinese nation fighting for its very existence.
  It is unnecessary for me to develop the thesis that a healthy and normal growth of Chinese nationalism is necessary to the stabilization of the peace of the East. It has been pointed out that, wherever there is a vast country rich in resources but weak in government and self-defence, that country is sure to become a centre of international strife, an arena of imperialistic powers fighting for special concessions and privileges. For decades, the weakness of the Chinese Government has been a temptation to aggressive powers, and the map of China to this day shows clear traces of that imperialistic struggle which prevailed in southeastern Asia during the last decades of the last century. Far-sighted statesmen of the world have always maintained that peace in the Far East is only possible when there is a free and independent China to ward off encroachments from outside. That was the idea underlying John Hay's Open Door Policy in China, and that was undoubtedly the political philosophy behind the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington under which the signatory powers pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."
  China had failed to live up to such expectations until the last decade when, as the world knows, she has actually begun in earnest to unify the country, modernize her institutions and her means of transportation and communication, and build up an "effective and stable government." But our nearest neighbor won't tolerate this endeavor on the part of China. Indeed, she has done everything possible to prevent the rise of a modern national state in China. China needs peace, but Japan gives us seven wars in six years; China wants unification, but Japan insists upon tearing China asunder and setting up bogus governments everywhere under Japanese control. China needs financial and technological assistance from all friendly powers, but Japan openly declared to the world on April 17, 1934, that she would not tolerate any concerted help to China "even in the name of financial and technical assistance." China needs "an effective and stable government," but Japan's military authorities have repeatedly declared that the Nanking Government under Chiang Kai-shek must be crushed at any cost.
  In short, Japan cannot allow a unified and modernized China to exist, and she has openly avowed her determination to crush it. She has been doing it for all these years, and she is doing it now on a much grander scale. Is it exaggerating the issue when I say that China is fighting for her very existence?
  This, then, is the first issue behind the war.
  But there is another and larger issue involved in the present conflict, which concerns not China alone, but the whole world. This issue I have stated as the clash of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order. This is the issue which formed the central thesis of President Roosevelt's Chicago speech and of Secretary Hull's Toronto speech. This is the issue of the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 6, and of the statement of the American Government made on the same date endorsing the League resolution. And, curiously enough, this is the same issue behind the theory of the so-called "have-not" nations having a "right" to invade and plunder the possessions of the "have" nations.
  Historically, the so-called "have-not" nations, Italy, Germany and Japan achieved their political unity about the same time—around 1870—and arose to the position of world powers much later than the other great powers. They entered the arena of imperialistic strife at a time when the earth, with the exception of a few storm centres, was already almost completely appropriated by the few colonial empires. During the last decades of the last century, the struggle for colonies and special concessions was very acute, and the law of the jungle reigned in those regions where the absence of a strong native government had invited imperialistic encroachment.
  But, with the turn of the century, a new and more humane kind of international relationship was slowly making its first appearance. The same Tsar of Russia, who had been grabbing territories in eastern Asia, was calling the first Hague Conference which resulted in the establishment of the first International Court. The Open Door Policy in China was announced by America in 1900. Peace movements and peace foundations were coming up in the democratic countries. A new international idealism was visibly at work for the rise of a new and more idealistic world order.
  Even the World War did not uproot this new internationalism, which, because of the terrible sacrifices of the War, had even more sympathetic and enthusiastic supporters and advocates throughout those agonizing years of the War and the Armistice. Even in the war message of President Woodrow Wilson of twenty years ago, we read that "we are at the beginning of an age where it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations."The great American President was universally acclaimed the leader of this international idealism, whose state papers and in particular whose "Fourteen Points" were eagerly read and accepted as the tenets of the new world order that was to come after the War.
  However disappointing the Versailles Peace Treaty may have been to some of us—a Treaty which the Chinese delegation refused to sign—the Peace Conference has left to the post-war world at least one monumental edifice of Wilsonian idealism in the founding of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League pledges to respect the territorial integrity of the Member States, stipulates international inquiry, arbitration and conciliation as the means for settling international disputes, and provides economic sanctions against nations resorting to war in violation of the provisions of the Covenant. For more than a decade, the League stood as the most concrete embodiment of the ideals of international peace yet invented by mankind.
  During that memorable decade, a number of similarly idealistic pacts and treaties were produced to supplement the League Covenant. These include the Nine-Power Treaty, the Naval Disarmament Treaties, the Treaty of Locarno which brought Germany into the League of Nations and which was then heralded as the stabilizer of the peace in Europe, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris which was to "outlaw war" as a means for settling disputes between nations.
  Thus for more than ten years, there actually existed a new and more civilized world order supported by an interlocking and overlapping set of international treaties.
  Now, it is not true that this new world order has been beneficial only to the small or weak nations. Law and order, national or international, protects and benefits the strong as well as the weak. If there be any partiality, it is usually in favor of the strong. For law and order the world over is usually made and maintained by the strong and powerful, who naturally derive greater benefits from it. Within the new world order which prevailed in those years the great powers were the greatest beneficiaries. France, for example, never felt safer than in those years. Great Britain practically gave up naval building and abandoned her project of constructing a great naval base at Singapore. Even Japan, who was always grumbling about the naval ratio of 5:5:3 and felt herself oppressed under the Washington Treaties, has never attained such height of international prestige and respect as she enjoyed in those years. She sat in Geneva as one of the "Big Four" Permanent Members in the Council of the League; and she was the undisputed supreme power of the western Pacific where she enjoyed her new possessions in the Mandate Islands and where her navy was strategically invincible.
  Unfortunately, there were certain militaristic groups in certain countries who found the restrictions of this new world order to be detrimental to their aggressive ambitions and who were determined to destroy them at the earliest possible opportunity.
  Thus, all of a sudden, this new world order was scrapped by the brutal hand of the Japanese military on the evening of September 18, 1931! In three months, the Japanese army had invaded and occupied all the three provinces in Manchuria. In January, 1932, she started the first Shanghai War which lasted 40 days and which cost 120,000 lives and damaged property estimated at over $400,000,000 gold. China appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Pact of Paris, but Japan defied the world by leaving the League and by declaring that she was fighting a war of self-defense and that all the idealistic treaties to which she had been a signatory were no longer applicable to her. With economic depression deepening everywhere, the whole world was powerless and helpless in coping with the situation and saving the new world order from ruin.
  On January 7, 1932, the United States, through her Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, proclaimed the "doctrine of non-recognition" in identic notes to China and Japan. This doctrine was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in a resolution which reads: "The Assembly declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League or to the Pact of Paris." This Stimson doctrine remains to this day the solitary reminder of the sanctity of a set of great and idealistic treaties, one of which, the Nine-Power Treaty, however, is recently revived by the calling of its signatory powers to meet in a conference at Brussels to discuss the Far Eastern situation.
  Undoubtedly, the destruction of the new world order by denying the sanctity of treaty obligations is the greatest crime committed by the Japanese military, by the Japanese Government which submitted to them, and by the Japanese nation which tolerates them and rationalizes and apologizes for them. By her acts of violence, Japan has released all forces of violence which had been placed under check within the new world order. It has been reported that, when Japan finally withdrew from the League of Nations in open defiance of the world, a German Cabinet Minister said to the Japanese Delegate: "We do not think you are right, but we thank you for your example." That was in the year 1933, the year of Hitler's ascendency to power, and the year in which Mussolini began to plan his invasion of Ethiopia! Japan's example has been faithfully copied by other powers who were signatories to all the early resolutions of the League condemning the action of Japan, including the one embodying the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition, but who, when they saw Japan's acts of violence go unchecked and undisciplined, were inspired to join her in their common cause to fight against the troublesome restrictions of a new world order.
  In a sense, China may be said to be fighting the war on behalf of the whole world: After two years of ardent appeals to the League of Nations and to the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, and after six long years of futile attempts to maintain peace and avoid a war, China is at last forced to fight for her own existence as well as for the maintenance of law and order in the family of nations.
  But it is not only the weak nations like China that are the victims of the destruction of the world order which, as I have shown, protects and benefits the strong as well as the weak. In the last six years of international anarchy, all the great powers of the world have been worried, troubled, humiliated, and even seriously threatened by the aggressor nations. Soviet Russia has had to amass a huge army of nearly half million men on her Far Eastern frontiers. Great Britain has hurriedly resumed and speedily completed her long abandoned naval base at Singapore, and is now spending $7,500,000,000 on her rearmament program. Even the peace-loving United States has had to revive her huge naval building program and to strengthen her naval fortifications in the Pacific. Even Australia and New Zealand, the two peaceful paradises of the southern Pacific, are seriously worried and are trying hard to build up their forces of national defense against possible attacks from the northern Pacific.
  Truly, as President Roosevelt has said in his Chicago speech, "there can be no possibility of peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small."
  This, then, is the second and larger issue behind the present conflict in the East. It is the issue of International Anarchy versus World Order.
  And, because this era of international anarchy began with Japan's invasion in Manchuria in 1931, Japan must be named "Public Enemy Number One" in the Family of Nations, and must be held responsible for the crime of destroying the New World Order which represented decades of idealistic thinking and which it may require another world conflagration to rebuild.
  To Have Not and Want to Have
  The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
  July, 1938. Vol. 198. pp. 59-64.
  Almost exactly eighteen months ago, in the same hotel and under the same auspices, I had the pleasure of speaking from the same platform with a distinguished Italian scholar who defended the right of the have-not nations to seek outlets for their population pressure and to control sources of supply for raw materials. He frankly said: "Force is the only solution. The inferior races must be sacrificed for the benefit of the strong."
  These words, which still ring in my ears, sum up the philosophy of force as preached by the dictators and apologists of the aggressor nations which choose to call themselves "the have-nots," as if to have not would somehow justify their right to plunder the haves! They have been saying to the world:
  To have not and want to have, the only way is by the use of military force. Down with the status quo, and down with every form of international order which recognizes and protects the status quo! And all the inferior peoples (meaning the weak and the militarily ill-prepared) must be sacrificed for the sake of the strong.
  What has happened in the world during the last seven years—ever since the first acts of Japanese aggression in China in September 1931—is nothing but this philosophy of force of the so-called have-not nations being ruthlessly but methodically tested out in actual application.
  It is the purpose of this paper to point out that this philosophy is economically unreal, politically self-defeating and suicidal, and philosophically impossible. As I come from a country which is one of the victims of this barbaric philosophy, I shall draw most of my illustrative materials from the Far Eastern regions of conflict.
  THE POPULATION QUESTION
  Let us first take up the problem of population pressure. Population pressure is solved by birth control, by voluntary emigration, by increased productivity of the soil, and by industrialization. Military conquest and political domination of territories already densely populated or climatically unsuited to large-scale emigration have never contributed much towards solving the population problem.
  Japan, for instance, has possessed Formosa for forty-three years, but the Japanese population there is only 264,000 in a total population of 5,000,000—that is, 5.2 per cent. She has had Korea for thirty years, but the Japanese population in Korea is 560,000 in a total of 21,000,000—i.e., 2.6 per cent. She has had dominating influence in Manchuria for over thirty years (ever since the Russo-Japanese War), and has completely occupied it for the last seven years. But before 1931, the Japanese population in Manchuria was always below 1 per cent of the total population; and even since 1931, while the number of Japanese soldiers, officials, and job-seekers has greatly increased, the actual number of agricultural emigrants to Manchuria has been only 5,000. And this in spite of several large-scale government subsidies to encourage agricultural emigration to Manchuria.