第八十八章《胡适英文论著：中国外交》（5）

  第八十八章《胡适英文论著：中国外交》（5）

  Professor Douglas Johnson, the noted geographer who had served as an expert with the American Peace Delegation in Paris in 1919, declared in a recent public statement that he saw no hope that any of the schemes of international peace would "ever bring durable peace so long as each of them lacks that one vital element to make it practically effective."
  "What is the missing element?" he asks. "It is the element of force ,—force to maintain just territorial and economic settlements against attacks by violence for selfish ends,—force to implement agreements to outlaw war, restraining the nation that battles in defiance of its most sacred pledges,—force to compel resort to peaceful methods of settling disputes,—force to assure acceptance of decisions reached through orderly procedures mutually agreed upon,—force to prevent armed conquest of a neighbor's lands,—and force to give all nations that security and confidence which is the essential prerequisite to general disarmament."
  With this view, I am in complete agreement. The new world order which we want to see set up after this terrible war must be a "League to Enforce Peace."It must be an international organization based upon the principle of a threat of overwhelming power to prevent aggressive wars. It must command a sufficient amount of internationally organized and internationally supported force for the effective enforcement of its own law and judgement.
  In short, we want a new world order which will devote its first efforts to the organization of the economic and military power of the post-war world for the effective enforcement of international peace and order. All other ornamental things such as "international intellectual co-operation" can wait. First things must come first.
  I was very happy, therefore, to read the Memorial Day speech of your Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, in which he declared that after this war, the United Nations should undertake "the maintenance of an international police power" until a permanent system of general security is fully established. Such a statement of policy by a responsible official of the American Government, I am sure, will be supported by all peace-loving nations.
  But, let me warn you, there will be strong opposition to such proposals as "an international police power" or "a league to enforce peace." Much of the opposition will surely be forthcoming from well-meaning pacifists with strong prejudices against the use of force as a necessary means for the enforcement of peace
  We must learn to think that there is nothing essentially evil in force which is but another name for the power or energy necessary for doing work or achieving ends; that force is only an instrument which, if properly controlled and directed, can become the very cornerstone of justice and order; and that all law, all peace and order, internal or international, are empty words if they cannot be effectively enforced by the organized power of the community. We must remember these wise words uttered by the French philosopher Pascal almost three hundred years ago:
  "Justice without force is impotent.
  Force without justice is tyrannical.
  We must, therefore, combine justice with force."
  Asia and the Universal World Order
  Contemporary China
  Dec. 14, 1942. Vol. II. No. 15. pp. 1-4.
  What kind of world order does Asia want? What problems does Asia expect this world order to solve? What benefits, national, international, continental, and worldwide, does Asia hope to derive from its establishment? What contributions can the peoples of Asia make to the future well-being and civilization under it?
  No one can answer these questions in behalf of Asia as a whole. What I have to say here barely scratches the surface of some of these questions and only represents the thinking of an individual Asiatic with some training in thinking internationally. Needless to add that my conclusions are predicated on the conviction that the United Nations will completely win the war and therefore will be in a position to win the peace.
  Ⅰ

  The first and greatest concern of Asia and of mankind, after this terrible war, will be security and order. Without some satisfactory solution of this primordial problem, all other problems of freedom, justice, economic well-being, and cultural advancement cannot be successfully tackled.
  The first problem, therefore, is the establishment of a world order which will afford to all nations some effective form of collective security and will aim at making aggressive wars impossible. In the words of the Atlantic Charter, this world order should "afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries."
  It now seems fairly generally agreed by the thinking public the world over that any jural international order to be set up after this war must have an internationally organized and internationally supported force for the effective maintenance and enforcement of peace, order, and law. Mankind must learn from the history of internal political development the plain lesson that government begins with the police power, that is, the power of enforcing public order and safety. Just as private individuals have learned to resign to their internal government their "natural right" to possess arms and to take justice in their own hands, so nations must now learn to rely more and more upon an international order for the effective maintenance of collective security. Recent history has brought home to us the painful truth that, in this modern world of ours, no nation, however powerful, can single-handedly defend itself against determined armed aggression by powerful aggressor states; that international law and solemnly pledged treaties can no longer protect the peaceful peace-loving states from aggressive wars; that no geographical isolation can afford such protection; and that, just as war has become global, so must mankind seek peace by means of a worldwide system of general security.
  Pacifists, religious or philosophical, need not be scared by the concept of international police power for collective security. It does not necessarily mean the policing of Germany by Anglo-American troops, or the policing of Japan by Chinese, Russian, and American soldiers. The concept of collective security, as I understand it, merely means the organizing of the economic and military power of the nations under definite and unmistakable terms of arrangement for the explicit purpose of preventing a possible outbreak of aggressive invasion and war. It means the setting up of machinery with clearly defined duties and responsibilities for the possible application of economic sanctions against would-be aggressor states in whatever corner of the globe. And it means the pooling and distribution of the international police force for the effective implementation of the economic sanctions against aggression.
  Let us take the Covenant of the League of Nations as an illustration. It is my firm belief that if the member-states of the League had from the start worked out and set up international machineries for the possible carrying out of effective economic sanctions, such as oil embargo, arms embargo, mineral and metal embargo against conceivable sources of aggression, if such procedure had been worked out and such machineries of control had been set up, the would-be aggressors would have been fore-warned and the catastrophic war might have been indefinitely postponed and possibly averted. Unfortunately, the League wasted twenty years without ever working out a procedure and setting up the necessary machinery for the possible invocation of Articles 10, 15, and 16 of the League Covenant. So when aggression came as it did to China in 1931, to Abyssinia in 1935, to Spain in 1936, to Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, the League was caught totally unprepared and the aggressors carried the day.
  Therefore I strongly advocate that the framers of the next peace should seek the advices of such geological and mineralogical experts as Sir Thomas Holland of Britain and Professor C. K. Leith of the United States in working out detailed plans for the effective control of minerals and metals as an essential part of future economic sanctions against aggression. The United Nations control more than three-quarters of the world's strategic mineral and metal resources and should have no hesitation to convert this source of international contention into an efficacious weapon of collective security.
  As to the military aspects of this question, it is only needful to point out that when the war is won by the United Nations, they will surely have complete control of the sea power of the world, and that it should not be difficult to work out some satisfactory scheme of converting an adequate portion of that overwhelming power into a police force of our new world order.
  The concept of international police and collective security, in short, merely means that the time has come for the community of civilized nations to think seriously about some kind of a joint police department to regulate traffic, to control fires, and to deal with crime. That is practically all there is to it.
  What is necessary for us to emphasize now is the platitudinous fact that law and order, national or international, do not mean the absence of force, but are always dependent upon some form of organized force for their effective enforcement. Any attempt to set up a jural order of the nations without some overwhelming force to back its own law and judgment will inevitably be scrapped in face of determined armed aggression. "Justice without force," said Pascal almost 300 years ago, "is impotent. Force without justice is tyranical. We must, therefore, combine justice with force."
  Ⅱ

  When the war is over, Asia will have about a dozen free and independent states: The Soviet Union, China, Japan, the Korean Republic, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Thailand, the Commonwealth of India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. With the exception of Japan, all these Asiatic states are peaceful and peace-loving states. The deep-rooted pacifistic tradition of China, India, and Korea cannot be doubted, and that tradition will grow in a new world wherein aggressive wars will be placed under control through the establishmnent of a system of collective security. The Moslem states have had a martial tradition; but in a new world order wherein the old imperialism of the European powers will be dead or rapidly disappearing, there is ample ground for hope that the Moslem world will be an important power for peace and continental solidarity. And the truly fundamental change in Russian foreign policy brought about since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 has marked the Soviet Union as one of the great pacifist powers and one of the earliest advocates of collective security. The recently published Soviet-British Treaty of May 26, 1942, furnishes the best proof that the U.S.S.R. will remain one of the greatest stabilizing powers in our new world order.
  A few problems, however, should be satisfactorily solved before the Asiatic states can settle down to enjoy "the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries."
  The most urgent of these will be the disarming of Japan. Some necessary steps will be undertaken by the United Nations during the period of "prolonged armistice." These steps will most probably include the surrender of the remaining Japanese navy, air force, and artillery; the international control of the mandated islands; the destruction of Japanese naval bases and fortifications as well as the evacuation of Japanese forces from all occupied territories on the continent of Asia and in the Pacific Islands.
  All these steps are in the direction of disarming Japan. The most necessary step, however, will be the discrediting of the militaristic caste and the militaristic policy by the final defeat of her army and navy and the destruction of their remaining equipment. This explosion of the myth of the invincibility of Japanese arms will go very far toward a psychological disarmament.
  Equally important will be the early establishment of an effective system of collective security in the postwar world. An international control of the mandated groups of islands and the organization and distribution of an international police in Asia and the Pacific Area, I believe, will have the desired effect of discouraging the rearming of Japan.
  Effective international control of strategical minerals and metals as an integral part of the system of collective security will be another method for the prevention of Japanese rearmament.
  The basic deficiency of Japan in minerals and metals needed for her industries must be considered as a most important factor in any future scheme of collective security. A scientific and judicious control of the sale to Japan of iron, steel, scraps, petroleum, antimony, aluminum, chromite, lead, nickel, manganese, tin, tungsten, and zinc may in time result in converting her "militaristic-industrial system" into an industrial system for the production of goods for peacetime consumption and for the economic well-being of her people. Such an international control of raw materials, I believe, can most effectively assist in the disarming of those "nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers."
  In short, I believe that the disarming of Japan can be best achieved by the defeat of Japanese arms, the discrediting of her militaristic tradition, the establishing of an international scheme of general security, and a judicious and efficient system of metal and mineral control as a part of the machinery for the enforcement of peace.
  Another problem of continental and world importance is the relationship between China and Soviet Russia. Japan's aggressions in Manchuria since 1931 have turned the attention of the Soviet Union to the Far East, brought hundreds of thousands of her troops to the Maritime Provinces and Siberia, and thereby made her once more a dominating power on the Pacific. Before this war is over, she will in all probability be forced to fight a great and difficult war in the Far East against Japan, and on the side of China, the United States, and Canada.
  Even long before Russia's heroic resistance turned the tide of the war in its European theatre, the U.S.S.R. had already been extending her helping hand to China throughout the five years of our war with Japan. This friendly assistance has been given to China without any condition of territorial concession, ideological surrender, or political interference. The only form of repayment has been a barter payment in Chinese goods and materials needed by Russia. Such friendly relations will surely develop into closer ties when Russia and China will be fighting the common enemy in Asia.
  It is my sincere hope that the time will soon come when China and the Soviet Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common foe, but in all times to come. With a common frontier extending nearly five thousand miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, non-aggression, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet Treaty. The historic example of 3,500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual benefit. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a mutual understanding between these two great countries which comprise three-quarters of the continent.
  Ⅲ

  What of the future of democratic development in Asia?
  It is my firm belief that two great historical events, namely, the defeat of Japan, Germany, and Italy by the United Nations and the establishment of a new world order capable of effective enforcement of peace and general security, will greatly inspire and aid the spread and development of democratic institutions in Asia. In this new world, China, the first non-European country to discard the monarchy, to establish a republican form of government, and to work out its own constitutional development, will undoubtedly continue her democratic evolution along the main lines laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The U.S.S.R., which has definitely come to the side of the democracies, will continue her political evolution in the direction of a great socialistic republic as outlined in her democratic constitution of 1936, and her influence will undoubtedly continue to be felt throughout Europe and Asia. The people of India, who have had the valuable experience of active political agitation and organization during the last quarter of a century, will be able to work out some form of federation under a democratic constitution. The Moslem world, following the successful experiments of modern Turkey, may also work out its own form of constitutional development. Even Japan, under such favorable conditions, may yet surprise the world by developing a more modern and democratic type of constitutional monarchy.
  All these democratic tendencies, I repeat, will be greatly aided and strengthened by the victory of the United Nations in the present war and by the successful establishment of a world system of collective security. Both of these historical conditions are necessary for the revival and revitalization of Asia's faith in the democratic ideals and institutions.
  For, we must remember, the faith of the people of Asia in the democratic form of government has been greatly shaken in the last quarter of a century. For many decades prior to 1917, liberals of Asia had been accustomed to believe that representative constitutional democracy was unquestionably the most perfect form of government ever invented by the political genius of man. The first violent attack on democracy came with the Conmunist Revolution in Russia. It was held by the advocates of the dictatorship of the proletariat that representative democratic government was the political concomitant of economic capitalism and should be smashed together with all other vestiges of bourgeois rule.
  Then came the equally violent attacks on democratic government from the extreme Rightist Reaction, from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. These new advocates of totalitarian dictatorships would shout to us that democracy is the decadent form of government, and that the democratic nations are decadent peoples doomed to be dominated by the more vigorous super-races. "The goddess of Liberty," said Mussolini in March 1923, "is dead and her body is putrescent."
  These vehement attacks on democratic ideals and institutions, whether from the Left or the Right, were carried out by the most aggressive weapon of propaganda. Through what Hitler describes as the technique of "thousandfold repetition of the most simple ideas," this anti-democratic propaganda was able gradually to undermine the faith of thousands of people in representative democratic government. It has certainly succeeded in converting the Japanese people among whom I have heard professed "liberals" tell me that the Anglo-Saxon people had become decadent and their political institutions hopelessly antiquated. And, I must confess, this propaganda has also made many converts in other Asiatic countries including my own.
  Such repercussions are quite natural and understandable. These wavering Asiatics, being human, cannot help sometimes mistaking glamorous military efficiency and success as evidences of possible soundness in social organization and political philosophy.
  Any one of my generation who can vividly recall the wonderfully thrilling and stirring experience on receiving the news of the last Armistice of November, 1918, and who has watched the great emotional, intellectual, social, and political upheavals in the subsequent months, can readily agree with me that a crushing defeat of Germany, Japan, and Italy by the United Nations in this war will surely have the electrifying effect of reviving and revitalizing Asia's faith in democracy. Such a final victory of the United Nations would completely nullify the evil effects of the anti-democratic propaganda of the last twenty-five years, and would transform and revolutionize the thought and imagination, and the whole social and political outlook of millions upon millions of people in Asia.
  But the other historical condition—the successful establishment of "a wider and permanent system of general security"—is equally necessary as a prerequisite for the peaceful development of democratic institutions in the Asiatic countries. Woodrow Wilson is eternally right in laying down the great dictum that the world must be made safe for democracy. The great tragedy of the last twenty years has been that the world had not been made safe for the peaceful and peace-loving democracies. A world that cannot afford security and peace to Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Czechoslovakia, is a world in which the most powerful democracies, France, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the United States, cannot possibly feel safe.
  The early history of mankind, both in the East and in the West, has taught us that ancient democratic states could not survive powerful foreign aggression. It was no historical accident that the first modern development of democratic institutions took place in the British Isles protected for centuries by the English Channel and the English Navy from continental invasion. Nor was it mere historical accident that the second and more important development of democratic government on an unprecedented continental scale took place in North America protected by the two greatest oceans. A comparison between the history of the American Republic and the French Republic during the last 150 years will convince us of the tremendous importance of the factor of security from aggression as an essential condition for the peaceful and continuous development of democratic life and institutions.
  If, therefore, we are really desirous to see democratic ideals spread and prevail in the postwar world, we must make our new world order so effective that it shall be able to make the world safe for democracy. The world must not forget that the splendid military resistance of Soviet Russia during the past year has been made possible by tremendous sacrifice and postponement of internal social, economic, and political progress. Nor must we forget that the Constitutional Convention which was to convene on November 12, 1936, to ratify the final draft of a democratic constitution of the Republic of China has been postponed for six years because of the threat of Japanese aggression and war.
  Whatever universal world order may be set up after this war, therefore, must devote its very first labors to the organization of the economic and military power of the nations for the effective maintenance and enforcement of peace, justice, and orderly relationships throughout the world. It must create the necessary condition for one of the Four Freedoms, the freedom from fear of aggression, without which the other three freedoms will have no leg to stand on.
  I firmly believe that when the Asiatic nations, including Japan, are thus assured of the freedom from fear of aggression under a system of collective security, they will steadily develop their own forms of democratic government and society. The revolutionizing effect of the military defeat of the aggressors on the social and political thinking of the peoples of Asia will then be strengthened and perpetuated by the more positive conditions of general security under which the nations will be enabled to work out their own problems of social, economic, and political reconstruction in peace without fear of external interference and without the necessity of squandering preponderate amounts of national income on preparations for defense and war. A quarter of a century of general peace and security will see the flowering and fruition of democratic ideas and institutions throughout the continent of Asia.
  Some people seem to be troubled by the thought that the absence of high percentage of literacy among the peoples of Asia may be a great hindrance to the development of democratic institutions. I believe that with peace and with modern technological improvement, it is not impossible for the nations of Asia to eliminate illiteracy in the near future. Japan did it in 50 years, and Soviet Russia has done it in 20 years. China can do it in even less time. But mere literacy without freedom in education and thought will merely qualify a people to be the willing victims of controlled propaganda. The future of Asiatic democracy will, therefore, depend on the spread and progress, not of mere literary education, but of freedom of thought and higher education.
  From other quarters the fear has been expressed that the centuries of colonial and semi-colonial status of many peoples of Asia must have made it difficult for them to develop into free and democratic nations. The real fact is that a people who have long been denied freedom are more anxious to acquire and enjoy it. When Ibsen was asked why he sent his son to Russia and not to America, the great Norwegian liberal and prophet replied: "Because the Russian people have no freedom and therefore better appreciate it." It is over 150 years since Jeremy Bentham published his pamphlet Emancipate Your Colonies! The time has now come to put his idea into execution. The best way to emancipate the colonies is to give them freedom which is the best schoolmaster of freedom itself.
  Other pessimistic thinkers hold that the economic poverty of the peoples of Asia may be another and more fundamental impediment to the development of democratic institutions. I have heard that rich men may not enter the Kingdom of Heaven but I have failed to see why poverty should disqualify a people from creating their own Kingdom on Earth. And I believe the program of economic reconstruction as envisaged in the Atlantic Charter and in the master lease-lend agreements recently concluded between the United States and the beneficiary nations will go very far in the alleviation of economic suffering and the betterment of general economic conditions in the postwar world. But these and other equally absorbing problems I prefer to leave to more competent savants to discuss.