第七十八章《胡适英文论著：民族危机与公共外交》（3）

  第七十八章《胡适英文论著：民族危机与公共外交》（3）

  Moreover, it seems to me as an amateur historian that there is much truth in the statement that our war of resistance is a kind of "revolutionary warfare"which can best be understood in the light of the history of the revolutionary wars of America, France, Russia and Turkey. Surely an American audience can appreciate this historical analogy. Not very long ago, an American friend wrote me these words: "China is now at Valley Forge; but I hope she will soon be at Yorktown." These words were written before I read General Chiang Kai-shek's message referred to above. It may not be entirely out of place for me to develop this historical analogy a little further.
  John Fiske, one of your most scientific historians, said: "The dreadful sufferings of Washington's army at Valley Forge have called forth the pity and the admiration of historians. As the poor soldiers marched on the 17th of December(1777) to their winter quarters, their route could be traced on the snow by the blood that oozed from bare, frost-bitten feet On the 23rd, Washington informed Congress that he had in camp 2,898 men 'unfit for duty, because they are barefoot, and otherwise naked.' Cold and hunger daily added many to the sick-list; and in the crowded hospitals,men sometimes died for want of straw to put between themselves and the frozen ground on which they lay. So great was the distress that there were times when, in case of an attack by the enemy, scarcely two thousand men could have been got under arms." (Fiske, The American Revolution , II, pp. 28-29.) That was Valley Forge in the winter of 1777.
  Shortly after that, the English Government under George III and Lord North offered peace by unconditionally repealing all the laws which had led to the revolt of the American Colonies. It was declared that Parliament would renounce forever the right to raise a revenue in America. And commissioners were sent to America to deal with Congress, armed with full powers to negotiate a peace.
  That was an offer of an honorable peace. Had the Fathers of this Republic accepted it, it could have avoided four more years of bloodshed and sacrifice, but there would have been no Independence and no United States of America.
  The founders of the American Republic rejected the peace of 1778 and fought on for four years longer and won the final victory at Yorktown in October, 1781.
  We must remember that those intervening years were often almost as difficult and perilous as the dreary winter at Valley Forge. There were military reverses and losses of territory, and there were internal troubles and even high treason. There was no continental government; after three years' discussion, the Articles of Confederation had not yet been adopted. The Continental Congress had rapidly declined in reputation and authority. Congress had no power to tax the States; it could only go on printing more and more "greenbacks" to finance the war. This paper money soon depreciated until, Washington said, "it took a wagon-load of money to buy a wagon-load of provisions." "Early in 1780 the value of the dollar had fallen to two cents, and by the end of the year it took ten paper dollars to make a cent The money soon ceased to circulate, debts could not be collected, and there was a general prostration of credit A barber in Philadelphia papered his shop with bills." "Under these circumstances, it became almost impossible to feed and clothe the army When four months' pay of a private soldier would not buy a single bushel of wheat for his family, and when he could not collect even this pittance, while most of the time he went bare-foot and half-famished, it was not strange that he should sometimes feel mutinous." (Fiske, op. cit ., II, pp. 196-200.)
  Such were the conditions in 1780. Yet Washington and his colleagues did not give up the fight. A year later, the final victory came at Yorktown which ended the military phase of the War of American Independence.
  I have gone into some details in describing the hardships and the difficulties of the War of 1776-1781, not only to show that the conditions of the Continental Army of Washington were not much better off than those of the National Army of China in the present war, but also to illustrate what General Chiang Kai-shek means by characterizing our war of resistance as "revolutionary warfare in which the spirit of the people will ultimately win out." All revolutionary wars were fought by poorly equipped but idealistically inspired peoples against the well-equipped regular armies of an oppressor or aggressor. In the end, final victory almost invariably came to those whose idealism and heroism could overcome the greatest hardship and sacrifice.
  If this is still wishful thinking, it is a type of wishful thinking so inspiring and so enticing that millions of my people are determined to test it out with their blood and their lives.
  *　*　*　*
  Before concluding, I like to make another observation,—again based on historical analogy. I like to ask a question: How did the fathers of this Republic ever get out of Valley Forge and march on to the final victory of Yorktown?
  All historians agree that two factors were responsible. The first was that the Revolutionary Army fought on in spite of almost unsurmountable difficulties. But there was another and equally important factor, namely, that the cause of the American Revolution was greatly aided by the international situation of the time. The England of George III was disliked and hated by the great powers of Europe, whose sympathies were naturally on the side of the American colonies. The Continental Congress sent a diplomatic mission to Europe, directed primarily to the French Court of Louis XVI. Among the members of the mission was Benjamin Franklin who later became the first American Minister to France, and who concluded a commercial treaty and a treaty of alliance with France and secured from France not only loans and subsidies totalling 45,000,000 livres , but also important military assistance in the form of a large and well-equipped expeditionary force. Even the most ardent advocate of American isolationism, Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis, tells us that "the combination of French armies and fleets in America with General Washington's forces brought about the final fortunate victory of Yorktown. The French alliance was decisive for the cause of American independence. No American should forget that." (Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States , p. 31.)
  But it was not the direct assistance from France that alone was decisive for the American cause. The whole international situation at that time was directly and indirectly advantageous to the American Revolution. France and England were in an undeclared war as early as 1778. Spain declared war on England in 1779. In 1780, Empress Catherine of Russia proclaimed the principle of the freedom of the seas and the right of neutrals, a principle which was immediately accepted by all the enemies of England. In 1780, too, Holland was at war with England. But the year before the British surrender at Yorktown, England was practically at war with the whole European world and her colonial possessions everywhere were seriously menaced by France and Spain. It was this adverse international situation which made it impossible for England to reinforce her armies fighting in America and to deal any effective blow to the relatively small forces of Washington.
  The moral of this historical analogy is quite clear. The final victory of China in her war of resistance to the aggressor, too, must depend upon two things: first, she must fight on, and she has no choice but to fight on; second, in her prolonged war, the time may come when the international situation may turn in her favor and against her enemy. She does not expect any other nation, however friendly and sympathetic, to take up arms and fight on her side. But she does expect, and she has a right to expect, that the sense of justice and the feeling of common humanity may yet be strong enough to move the men and women of the democratic and peace-loving countries to put a stop to the inhuman traffic of supplying weapons of war and essential raw materials for the manufacturing of weapons of war to a nation which was unanimously condemned by over 50 nations as the violator of solemnly pledged treaties and as the breaker of world peace, and which I do not hesitate to name as Public Enemy Number One among the family of nations.
  National Crisis and Student Life
  The Chinese Christian Student
  Dec., 1938. Vol. 29. No. 2. pp. 3-4.
  It is a great honor to come to this gathering of Chinese Christian students, although you know I am not a Christian. One of the Chinese characteristics is tolerance towards religion. For example, I always like to tell my American friends that I am a non-believer; yet I am a trustee of a Catholic university which has a Protestant president.
  My topic today is "National Crisis and Student Life." Our trouble today is that we are beginning to wake up only when it is too late. Our old proverb says,"You should repair your roofs and walls before the rain comes and do not try to drill a well when you are already thirsty." But things as they are now, with the conflagration already in full force, we are just beginning to be worried: what shall we do and what can we do?
  At the very outset, we must clearly understand that this crisis is too stupendous. In a crisis of such magnitude we as individuals can do very little. Even as a small group, very little contribution can be made.
  Propaganda? What will your propaganda amount to? How many people can you reach? Of those whom you can reach, how many can you move? My speaking experiences in the last nine months led me to believe that very little can be achieved through speaking. Those who are with you are always with you, while those who are against you are always against you. For example, can you expect to convince some of the Senators who are against you? The purpose of speaking is to win sympathy and to get action. There is 100 per cent sympathy, but no action.
  To raise money? How much can you raise? A few dollars towards the relief fund? What good does that amount do? Then, to urge boycott? How difficult it is to urge American women to wear cotton stockings instead of rayon. So what effect can boycott do? No. These are not of the first importance. The thing which is really needed is international action to restore peace in the Far East which we can legitimately expect. It is the positive action to stop war. This you and I cannot get.
  Let us also clearly understand that this war is not an accident. Nor are our losses and our suffering accidental. They are expected by everybody including ourselves. The causes of our losses are so fundamental that we can't help admitting them. The fundamental cause is that we are backward; backward in education, in science, in industry, in technology as well as in military preparation. The modern war is a war of machine, of scientific and technological achievements; it is a war of social and political organizations, of education and administration.
  We know that, but we do not admit it. Only very few dare to admit it. We lack intellectual honesty if we talk about winning the war. General Chiang knew the situation much better than we do. On July 17, 1937, he told the educational leaders at the Kuling conference that if war could be avoided, we must prepare for two things: first, to fight a long war of retreat and defeat, and, secondly, to be ready to endure the most acute suffering. Irresponsible civilians did not know the real situation, so they talked about war lightly. We must also understand that the war cannot and will not alter the level of our backwardness; it only accentuates it. It is a heavy and cruel penalty for our backwardness. It publicizes and advertises our backwardness and makes the whole world see it. At least, it should make ourselves see it more clearly than ever before. Even winning the war does not make us a great nation. Our backwardness remains; the destructions, devastations, and sufferings will only make this backwardness all the more backward.
  Our task is, therefore, very clear. It is to do our part to remove a little bit of the backwardness. It is to contribute our utmost to the future building of the nation. Our task is of the future . At present, we can't do very much. We should dedicate ourselves to the great task of eliminating our backwardness and of building up the future of our national life. We are builders; at least, workers of the future China. What we need to do at present is to find out what China needs most and what we can best fit ourselves to do.
  My advice to you may seem to be heartless. I, however, earnestly hope you would not be too much disturbed by the present and forget the future. Don't be depressed by the reports of defeats in the papers. It may be necessary for us to forget and ignore the present in order to devote ourselves to prepare for the future. Goethe, a German, told us in his chronology that in any national trouble he tried to forget the present by devoting himself to study. He studied the color effect of light on plants. He even devoted himself to the study of Chinese language.To give you another example. Chu Kuo Liang plowed his field in the days of turmoil and lived a retired life at Nanyang. When Liu Pe called on him, he predicted the things which would happen in the coming decades of years. In one of his letters, he advised, "Be calm and tranquil in order that you may cover the longer distance." Tseng Tze also taught us: "The burden is heavy and the journey is long." We, therefore, have to think in terms of a long distance, or a long journey.
  It is also necessary to remember that the war may be a long one. General Itagaki who took part in the plot of the Manchurian affair knew the situation very well. He predicted that the war might last ten or twenty years. If there were no international action, there would be no end of war. War has the tendency of perpetuating itself. The Spanish war was expected to end long ago, but it is still going on. Therefore, this war of ours will not end so soon. Even after the war is over, the war against poverty, against disease, against general backwardness must still be very long and bitter.
  But this should not lead us to despair. A Chinese proverb says: "For a seven-year disease, it is not too late to start preparing the cure which requires three years' labor." It is never too late to prepare ourselves for the future. Today, it is too late to do anything of immediate effectiveness. But to prepare for the future, you are never too late. This is high time to work hard. Don't worry. Worrying leads you nowhere, but hard work will lead you somewhere. Japanese are stupid; they know it. But in the first lesson of their primer, they learn the lesson of the race between a tortoise and a hare. It is the tortoise which wins the prize. If you do not add the hare's rapidity to the tortoise's industry, you can go nowhere. Mr. Wen Hau preached hard work long ago in the magazine edited by himself. If there were any religion worth believing now, it is this new religion of hard work.
  For the time being, we may ask, what China needs most and what I can do. Some think the first question is more important. It is not. Individual ability should be emphasized. Three hundred and sixty professions are all needed. It is, therefore, not necessary for anyone to give up his own line of work and to change to what he considers China needs most. Positively not. The future of China needs everything. We can't be proficient in all fields, but only in one or at most in two, so don't try to sacrifice a first-rate preacher, poet, etc., to become a third or fourth rate electrician or aviator. It is important not to be deceived by an easy assumption and not to let the apparent national needs becloud our individual fitness. If you are good for nothing at present, you may be good for the future. So follow your own interests and aptitudes and prepare yourselves!
  But how do you know your own interests? In most cases, you don't know. You must find out by exploring, by adventuring into the unknown and the unfamiliar. Find yourself by cultivating as many interests as you can. Galileo first studied medicine, then painting. One day, he happened to listen to the lectures on Euclid's geometry which interested him so much that he gave up medicine and painting to take up physics. Let us not be mistaken by our own attitudes. China needs men of every ability and every profession. So develop yourselves according to your aptitudes, and work hard.
  As you are Christians, let me give you a living example of a Japanese Christian. You may be interested in one article in the Christian Science Monitor which said that in these days of war, Kagawa was still working very hard and continuing to use the proceeds from his writings to support nineteen churches, seventeen kindergartens and schools, six cooperatives, one research center and two monthly publications.
  In conclusion, this national crisis is stupendous. We must confess our impotence and backwardness in order to change the course of events. You are for the future and of the future. Remember not to be disturbed by the present. Ignore the present, if possible, and dedicate yourself to the future China!
  The Meaning of October Tenth
  The Chinese Christian Student
  Oct./Nov., 1939. Vol. 30. No. 1-2. p. 4.
  First of all, I want to express the appreciation of the Chinese Community to the New York World's Fair authorities for their gracious act of designating this day as "China Day" at the Fair. This act is all the more generous because China, as you all know, withdrew last year from her original plans of participating in the national exhibits at the Fair. By this kind invitation today, the Fair authorities have shown us that they have forgiven China's desertion in a worthy cause,—a desertion which was forced upon her by the necessities of a protracted war of aggression on her own soil.
  We are assembled here to commemorate the 28th Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. October Tenth is to every Chinese what the Fouth of July is to the American citizen. The Revolution of 1911, which broke out on that day, not only overthrew the Manchu Dynasty, but also put an end to all monarchical rule in China. Thus the Chinese Revolution was of a twofold significance: it was a racial or nationalistic revolution in that it threw off an alien yoke of 270 years; and it was a political revolution of the first magnitude in that it was the first successful overthrow of the monarchical form of government on the continent of Asia.
  At that time, and for many years afterwards, this twofold significance was not fully appreciated. It was easy for the world to see that the Manchu rule was successfully overthrown, and never to return. But it was not easy for the casual observer to admit that the Chinese Revolution was equally successful in building up a truly lasting democratic political structure.
  This failure to recognize the achievements of the political phase of the Revolution is understandable. You can overthrow an old monarchy overnight, but you cannot build up a democracy within the brief space of one or two decades. The world only saw the years of internal strife and civil wars that followed the Revolution of 1911. But it has failed to see that, beneath the surface of apparent disorder and disintegration, great changes were taking place and were affecting basically the social and political life of the nation.
  To the vast number of the people, the success of the Revolution meant that"even the Emperor must go." That idea is most revolutionary. For what else can have greater power and greater permanence than the institution of the Emperor, which seems to have stood the test of time for thousands of years? If the emperor can be swept away by the tide of the times, nothing else seems sacred enough to remain unaffected by the onslaught of the new ideas and practices.
  That was exactly what was happening in the years following the Revolution. With the downfall of the Dynasty, there were gone all the numerous institutions which had been for centuries its paraphernalia,—among other things, the Manchu garrisons, the ignorant parasitic nobility born to power, the eunuch, the state religion, the public sale of office, and the absolute power of the monarch to punish, to imprison, and to kill. The mere overthrow of these long sanctified institutions and usages has had a liberating influence far greater than the outside critic was capable of imagining at the time.
  The political significance of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 consisted chiefly in the removal of a center of blind and unenlightened power which could have easily suppressed any idea or movement not to its liking. The old Monarchy together with its vast paraphernalia was incapable of effective leadership for reform, but it had the power to retard progress. The many reforms of the year 1898, for example, were nullified overnight by the ignorant and much over-rated Empress Dowager, who imprisoned her own Emperor son and beheaded without trial six leaders of the reform movement. A movement such as the "Literary Renaissance" of the last 20 years could have been easily killed under the old Monarchy; a Memorial to the Throne from one of the Imperial censors would have been sufficient to imprison the leaders and suppress the whole movement.
  The downfall of the absolute power of the monarchy, therefore, furnished the precondition of an age of intellectual freedom and social and political change. The 28 years under the Republic have been most important in the intellectual and social history of the Chinese nation. During these decades a thorough and fundamental process of modernization has been going on in China and has affected almost every phase of the cultural, social and political life of the people. As one who has not only watched but also participated in these changes, I can testify that these changes, these intellectual and social movements, would have been impossible without the success of the Revolution of 28 years ago.
  The most characteristic feature of the Chinese intellectual and social movements of the last two or three decades is the almost complete freedom with which Chinese intellectuals have discussed and criticised every phase of national life. Nothing seems too sacred to be subjected to criticism. The legendary Sage-Emperors, Confucius and Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, family life, marriage, filial piety, God or the gods and spirits, immortality,—none of these has escaped the new spirit of searching criticism and doubt. I sincerely believe that this spirit of freedom in thought, research, and expression would have been absolutely impossible if the Fathers of the Republic had not overthrown those terrible forces of oppression in the command and under the protection of the old Monarchy.
  These blessings of freedom will be better appreciated if we only cast a critical glance at the intellectual, social and political life of our closest neighbor, the so-called "Modern Japan." When we realize how little freedom is allowed to scholars and thinkers in Japan and how solicitously some of the intellectual absurdities and dynastic and religious myths of Japan are protected from the so-called "dangerous thought,"—then, but not until then, will we fully understand the great liberation which was brought about in China 28 years ago.
  Therefore, I invite you all to join me today in commemorating this 28th Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution that, not only freed the Chinese Nation from almost three centuries of alien domination, but also liberated the Chinese mind and Chinese life and brought about three decades of liberal thinking and critical scholarship—which, to me, mean far more than military strength or naval power.
  The Present Situation in China
  China Monthly
  Jan., 1940. Vol. 1. No. 2. pp. 4-5; 12-13.
  Ⅰ

  Japan's aggressive war in China which began in September, 1931, has been going on for more than eight years. Its latest phase of continued large-scale hostilities has been going on for exactly twenty-nine months. By the New Year Week, the war will be two and a half years old.
  Four weeks ago, on November 12th, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek summed up the first two and a half years of the war by saying that as the war went on, Japan had become weaker and weaker, while our power of resistance had become stronger and stronger. Has he been over-optimistic or unrealistic?
  First, it is not difficult to show that China's power of resistance has become greater today than ever before. In the same speech, General Chiang said that, since the outbreak of the war in 1937, our military strength today had been more than doubled. These words of the Chinese Commander-in-Chief were confirmed a few days ago by the Japanese Premier, General Nobuyuki Abe, who told the Osaka commercial leaders that General Chiang Kai-shek still had about 2,000,000 soldiers in the field, and that the final solution of the "China Incident" might take from five to ten years.
  Our great strength lies in what the Physicist calls "Mass," that is, vast space and great numbers. Japan with her 70 million is trying to conquer a population of 450 million. The war fronts now extend from beyond the Great Wall to the Western River Valley, fully two thousand miles. It is estimated by conservative neutral observers that, on the various fronts taken together, Japan has been and is losing at least from 800 to 1,000 men every day, without any major frontal battles. That is about 300,000 to 360,000 men in a year!
  During the last eight months, our soldiers have been doing very well, not only in guerrilla warfare, but also in frontal battles. We have inflicted severe defeats on the invaders in Southern Shansi and Northern Hupei. And in the first days of October, the Chinese armies in Northern Hunan and Northern Kiangsi scored a series of signal victories over the Japanese troops attempting to capture the city of Changsha. Japanese dead were estimated at 30,000. And the Japanese Army Headquarters declared that the city of Changsha was of no military value!
  General Chiang has elsewhere told the world that the strategy of the Chinese defender consists of "trading space for time" and of "achieving a great victory by accumulating small victories. One can best appreciate the meaning of his famous phrase "trading space for time," when one recalls the lightning rapidity with which Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and even Poland were overpowered and extinguished by their aggressors.
  We have temporarily lost some very important territory. But we have gained two and a half years of time! And we are quite confident that we can "achieve a great victory by accumulating small victories." One can fight on for another two and a half years, or as the Japanese Premier has predicted, from five to ten years. Time is our ally. The longer we fight on, the more confident we become, and the stronger we become.
  Ⅱ

  Nor is it hard to demonstrate that, the longer the war goes on, the weaker becomes Japan. Indeed the war is already exposing to the world many weaknesses of Japan as a nation.
  I shall not dwell on the low opinion which foreign military experts have expressed about Japan as a military power. Nor shall I stress the moral depravity of the Japanese fighting forces as evidenced in their conduct in occupied areas in China, or in their peculiarly Nipponese method of conquest by poisoning the conquered population by army-controlled traffic in highly concentrated narcotics.
  Nor shall I try to emphasize the great political and intellectual weaknesses of the Japanese nation by pointing to the complete disappearance of liberalism and radicalism with the outbreak of the war, or to the complete absence of national leadership after eight years of continental warfare.
  I shall confine myself to one phase of Japan's weakness which can be seen in statistical figures, namely, her economic weakness. It has been estimated that the cost of the first two years of the war, plus the cost of the Manchurian invasion and occupation, is eight times the combined costs of the first Sino-Japanese War(1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).
  And the national budget of 1939 is seven times that of 1931:
  19311,476,000,000 yen, 100%
  19375,436,000,000 yen, 370%
  19388,393,000,000 yen, 570%
  19399,450,000,000 yen, 700%
  To meet this gigantic expenditure, the Japanese Government has had to resort to such inflationary methods as the increase of paper notes and of loan issues:
  Loan Issues
  19373,300,000,000 yen
  19385,400,000,000 yen
  1939 (Estimated)5,924,469,000 yen
  This is far beyond the capability of the Japanese bond market to absorb. By the end of 1938, there was already 3,160,000,000 yen's worth of new bonds left in the hands of the banks.
  Moreover, the war has necessitated the drastic curtailing of Japanese exports, which has led to the unfavorable balance of trade. And the imports of ammunitions and of raw materials for the war industries must be paid in gold. The result has been the rapid disappearance and exhaustion of the Japanese gold reserve.
  Japanese Gold Sold to the U.S.A.
  Being weak in such "key commodities" as oil, scrap-iron, copper, lead, nickel, rubber and metal-working machinery, Japan must import them from abroad. Therefore, the decrease in her export trade and the exhaustion of her gold constitute a very serious situation. And there seems to be no end of the war in sight.
  I am, therefore, justified in saying that, during these twenty-eight months of the war, Japan's weaknesses are fully and clearly revealed to all who can read. The world is witnessing one of the greatest tragedies of human history, namely, a great nation light-heartedly throwing overboard its glorious achievements of 60 years and foolhardily committing hara-kiri on a gigantic scale. The world is witnessing the greatest weakness of the Japanese nation, namely, its inability to control its military machine even at the risk of national perdition.
  Ⅲ

  There is another way of looking at the situation in the Far East. China is fighting her war of resistance to aggression, and she is fully conscious that she not only has the sympathy of the civilized world on her side, but has been actually fighting with the material and political assistance of the friendly nations. On the other hand, Japan stands isolated and condemned as the "Public Enemy Number One" in the family of nations. She has been recently deserted by her friend and partner, Germany, and is now shamelessly trying to bluff the democratic nations by threatening to join hands with Soviet Russia!
  I wish I could make you all fully appreciate what a world of difference it makes whether you fight a war with the sympathy or with the condemnation of the whole civilized world on your side! This almost unanimous sympathy on the side of China has been an important factor in buttressing our morale throughout these months of distress and tribulation. And it is this same sympathy that has been largely responsible for the not inconsiderable amount of material and political help from all of China's friends.
  Of course, there were Chinese optimists who had entertained extravagant expectations of the friendly powers and who naturally felt greatly disappointed when China had to fight Japan single-handed for more than two years without any other Pacific Power jumping into the war on our side. But those of us who know the international situation and who understood the war-weary psychology of the peace-loving nations, never cherished great hopes for China to secure military, financial or material aid from her foreign friends.
  Yet, the Chinese cause was so convincingly appealing and the conduct of Japanese military so horribly aggressive that China soon found every friendly power quite ready to give her assistance in every way possible. Indeed, China could not have fought so well and so long without the help of Great Britain, France, Soviet Russia and the United States.
  Soviet Russia, which is nearest to us and least afraid of Japan's military strength, and which has the least vested interests in China at stake, naturally feels most free to give China assistance. The aid from the Soviet Union has been two-fold: first, by amassing a great military force along the Manchurian and Mongolian borders, thereby making it necessary for Japan to maintain at least a third of a million of her best-trained and best-equipped troops in Northern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; and, secondly, by selling to China partly on credit, and partly by barter, a large amount of arms, ammunitions, war planes and quantities of oil.
  I take this opportunity to point out that this assistance from the Soviet Union has been given to us, not only because it is to her national interest to do so, but also because Soviet Russia was for years at the height of her international idealism and was therefore sympathetic with China's resistance to Japanese aggression. As far as I know, there has not been any string tied to this assistance, neither ideological surrender nor territorial concessions.
  Great Britain and France both have vast interests in various parts of China which can be easily threatened by Japan. Moreover, ever since 1935, both Great Britain and France had been so much occupied by the European situation that they were unable to devote much attention to the Far East. Yet, in spite of these great difficulties, both Britain and France have been quite generous in their help to China during these two and a half years of the war. Great Britain has rendered great assistance to China by supporting the Chinese national currency ever since the days of November, 1935, when the new currency policy was first proclaimed by the Chinese Government. For fifteen months, the British colony of Hongkong was the greatest port of entry for Chinese munitions and war materials; and, even after the loss of Canton, Hongkong is still one of the most important side-doors for free China. And it is Great Britain and France which now give to China the use of her two great back-doors, the two great accesses to the sea: namely, the French Indo-China Route and the British Burma Route.
  It is unfair to say that such aid from Great Britain and France has been given to China simply because British and French Imperialism is anxious to defend itself against the menace of Japanese Imperialism. It is, I repeat, largely the manifestation of deep-rooted sympathy. This sympathy we can understand better now that these democracies are actually engaged in a terrific war which, in the words of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, aims at "the defeat of that aggressive, bullying mentality which seeks continually to dominate other peoples by force, which finds brutal satisfaction in the persecution and torture of inoffensive citizens, and which, in the name of the interest of the state, justifies any repudiation of its own pledged word whenever it finds it convenient."
  Naturally my people have expected more moral, political and material support from the people and government of the United States. In this expectation, we have not been disappointed. You all know that, under the Silver Purchase Act, your Department of Treasury has bought vast quantities of our nationalized silver which purchase has been of the greatest help to China. And you all know of the $25,000,000 credit which the Export-Import Bank gave to a Chinese trading corporation last December, and which has been indirectly responsible for China's securing subsequently more credits from other countries amounting to over 50 million dollars. But the world little realizes that that 25 million dollars' credit was a thousand times more significant than the figures might indicate, because this financial assistance came at a time when China's last main access to the sea had been cut off with the loss of Canton, and her morale probably at the lowest ebb. Future historians will surely say that the Export-Import credit of last December, not a very large amount in itself, had the magic effect of reviving and buttressing the spirit and morale of Chinese resistance, because it made China understand that she had not been deserted by her friends in her darkest hours of distress.
  The same magic touch was again given to China by the American Government on July 26, 1939, when it suddenly but apparently nonchalantly notified Japan of the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. This action has once more given the greatest encouragement to the Chinese nation because it came at a time when Great Britain had just been forced to make an important concession to Japan in her negotiations in Tokyo, and China was beginning to wonder whether practical difficulties and threatened interests were actually compelling her friends to desert her. The American Government's action once more dispelled all such doubts; it gave moral encouragement to China by strengthening her friends and dumbfounding her enemies.
  Ⅳ

  The abrogation of the Commercial Treaty with Japan was announced in Washington on July 26. At that time, the European situation was rapidly and radically deteriorating. On August 23, the text of the Non-Aggression Pact between Soviet Russia and Germany was published. German invasion of Poland began shortly afterward and the great European War broke out in the first days of September. This great war has now been going on for over three months.
  What effects has the European War had or will it have on the Sino-Japanese War in the Far East?
  For weeks there were grave apprehensions on the part of the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people. There was the danger of Great Britain and France being forced to make important concessions to Japan at the expense of China; there was even the danger of the Indo-China and the Burma Routes being closed by the French and British at the point of the Japanese bayonet; and there was the danger of Soviet Russia abandoning her policy of assistance to China.
  I am happy to say that so far the situation has turned out to be very much better than it had first appeared. The Soviet-German Pact, apparently negotiated and concluded without the knowledge of Japan, was considered by Japan as a betrayal by her supposed friend and ally, Germany. In her strong resentment against Germany, the Japanese Government declared the Anti-Comintern Pact dead. She now feels herself more isolated than ever. She does not know where to turn next. She will probably remain in that state of bewildered isolation for some time to come.
  In this state of resentment and bewilderment, Japan has so far not dared to attack the British and French possessions in East Asia. Recently Britain and France have slightly reduced their armed forces in North China. It is quite possible that the European situation may force the British and the French to make some other minor concessions to Japan on the mainland of Asia. But we are reasonably confident that these democratic powers which have undertaken to fight a terrific war for the purpose of defeating the continual threat to dominate the world by force, surely will not betray or desert China which, for over two years, has already been fighting the world's first battles against aggression. Indeed such a betrayal of China would emphatically belie all their professed war aims and peace aims.
  As to what Soviet Russia will do in the Far East, no one can tell. But this much I can say: After almost four months of intermittent warfare on the Mongolian-Manchurian border, Russia and Japan signed on September 15 an agreement which brought about a cessation of hostilities and established a joint commission to examine the disputed boundaries. On October 31, Premier Molotoff of the Soviet Union, in the course of his report on Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Soviet, said that "the possibility has been established of starting Soviet-Japanese trade negotiations" and that they (the Soviets) "look with favor on Japanese overtures of this kind." A few days later, however, the Communist International in Moscow issued a manifesto calling upon the workers and farmers of the world to rise and support the Chinese people in their heroic resistance to Japanese aggression. So far there has been no indication that the Soviet Union has abandoned or will abandon her policy of assistance to China.
  In short, there have been "beginnings of improvement of relations" between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and there have been "Japanese overtures" for trade negotiations; but Soviet Russia apparently is still continuing to give help to China in her war against Japanese invasion.
  Whatever effects the European War may produce on the Sino-Japanese conflict, and whatever changes may come in the international line-up in the Far East, one thing is certain: namely, that the Chinese people are determined to fight on, for many more months and possibly for many more years to come, until our enemy is economically so exhausted and militarily so bogged down that it will be willing to accept a just and endurable peace. This is not impossible. You will remember that in November, 1918, when the Armistice came to the last world war, Germany was still occupying almost the whole of Belgium and a large portion of France, but the war had been lost for the Germans.
  And this break-down of Japan can be greatly accelerated by an effective boycott of Japanese goods and an effective embargo of essential war materials to Japan by the peace-loving and democratic peoples who have been supplying Japan with foreign exchange and with scrap-iron, oil, copper, cotton and metal-working machinery. When Japan's unfavorable trade balance is becoming unbearable, when her domestic loan issues can no longer be absorbed by the native banks and investors, when her gold holding is completely exhausted and when she has nowhere to go to replenish her exhausted war supplies, then a little pressure from without will tell effectively just as the proverbial last straw breaks the back of the camel.
  In conclusion, I cannot help quoting once more from the November 12 speech of General Chiang Kai-shek, in which he says: "It is fortunate for the world that the European War was started 26 months after China had taken up our war against Japanese aggression." "Today Japan no doubt still has the ambition to seize the opportunity of the war in Europe to fish in troubled waters; but she has been deeply bogged down and greatly weakened by our armies and is no longer powerful enough to effectively threaten the world with her forces of aggression."
  It is in this sense that China may be said to have been fighting these 30 months on behalf of the civilized and peace-loving world. This is the larger historical significance of China's war of Resistance.
  We Are Still Fighting
  China Magazine
  Feb., 1940. Vol. XVI. No. 1. pp. 4-6.
  Two years ago, I pointed out that the issues behind the Far Eastern conflict were: (1) the clash of Japanese imperialism with the legitimate aspirations of Chinese nationalism, and (2) the conflict of Japanese militarism with the moral restrictions of a new world order. I still believe that these are the real issues. But I now see they are closely related to each other.
  In order to see these issues in their close relationship, we must go back a few decades in history when three of the seven great world Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, first succeeded in achieving their internal unity and began to embark on their new national life in a world which had been, for the most part, already appropriated by the more advanced colonial empires. These three Powers are now calling themselves the "Have Not" nations simply because they came to the world too late—Italian independence, German unity, Japanese restoration being almost contemporaneous events taking place about 1870. Naturally in their expansionist movements, they turned to those regions which Walter Lippmann once called"the stakes of diplomacy," regions vast in territory, rich in resources, but weak in government and in the power of resisting an external aggression. Parts of Africa, Arabia, Persia , the Balkan States, Turkey and China were among these "stakes of diplomacy" where, during the last century, the struggle for colonies and special concessions was very acute and where the "law of the jungle" reigned almost supreme.
  It did not require special wisdom to see that an international conflagration was brewing out of these imperialistic struggles. In fact, an international war—a"world war"—did break out in China in 1900 and was participated in by eight Powers of the world, including Japan and the United States. The allied forces of these eight Powers stormed the forts of Taku, and marched on the ancient capital of Peking, which they occupied for several months. In the meantime vast hordes of Czarist Russian armies poured into Manchuria. There were loud outcries of"Partition of China" and there was imminent danger of a real world war to be fought on the unequal division of spoils in China.
  That international conflagration at the turn of the century was averted by the gradual working out of an international order in the Far East under the leadership of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. An Englishman, Alfred E. Hippisley, and an American, William W. Rockhill, worked out the principle of the Open Door policy in China and the American Secretary of State, John Hay, adopted it as early as 1899 and proclaimed it to the world in a series of notes to the various Powers interested in China. Throughout the years of the so-called "Boxer War"and the peace negotiations following it, the American insistence on the Open Door in China, and the British support of that policy had a sobering effect on the more aggressive Powers, especially Russia, Germany and Japan. And the result was the evacuation of the allied forces after the peace protocol had been signed and put into effect. Thus was China saved from the fate of being the seat of the first world war in the 20th century.
  The Open Door policy has since been the cornerstone of the international order in the Far East. It has been incorporated in all the international agreements affecting China, and it has been regarded as one of the few great principles of the foreign policy of the United States.
  The principles of the Open Door policy are most explicitly stated in the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Article I of which says:
  "The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:
  (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
  (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
  (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
  (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."
  From this statement we can see that the Open Door principle is not merely an economic policy with its sole emphasis on equal opportunity for commerce and industry. It is a politcal doctrine of great historic significance in that it, as is shown by the first Article of the Nine Power Treaty, stresses the importance of respecting "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and providing "the fullest and the most unembarrassed opportunity for China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." As recent historical scholarship has indicated, the founders of the Open Door policy clearly conceived from the very beginning that the economic phase of the Open Door , namely, equal opportunity of trade, was dependent upon the political independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The door of China can be kept open only by an independent, sovereign state of China with a modern government sufficiently effective and stable to protect the rights and interests, not only of China herself, but of the nations having friendly relations with her.
  This Far Eastern international order, dating back to the end of the last century and receiving its full and unmistakable restatement in the Nine Power Treaty, naturally became a part of the new post-War world order which, as we all know, not merely stands on the Covenant of the League of Nations, but is also supported by a series of other idealistic treaties, such as the treaties of the Washington Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pacts. It is this international order of the Pacific region, in its older and newer forms, that has been responsible for the sheltering and protection of China throughout the first three decades of the century against many a threatening aggression; and for enabling her to work out the necessary steps in her process of developing a modern effective and stable government for herself. Under its shielding, China brought about two important and fundamental political revolutions (1911-12 and 1926-27), fought several civil wars and, at least from 1927 on, was beginning seriously to convince the outside world of her ability to develop and maintain for herself a modern national state. She was successfully unifying the country, modernizing her institutions and her means of transportation and communication and building up a modern national life.
  But unfortunately the rise of a modern national state in China was not to the liking of our nearest neighbor, Japan, whose military caste had long believed that Japan had a divine mission to dominate, not only Eastern Asia, but the whole world. These militarists, and in particular the young officers, could not and would not tolerate China's endeavors to build up a unified and modernized state. They were determined to crush nationalistic China before it could attain stability and strength. So eight years ago on the evening of September 18, 1931, the Japanese army in Mukden created the "Mukden Incident" and in a few months the Japanese troops were occupying the major portion of the Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria.
  But Japan could not invade China and occupy Chinese territory without at the same time destroying the international order both in the Far East and in the world at large, under which the respect for Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity had been explicitly pledged and China was solemnly promised"the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity" to work out her national development. China naturally appealed to the League of Nations and to the signatories and adherents of the Nine Power Treaty. What happened during those memorable years of 1931 and 1932, when the League of Nations attempted to mediate for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute, need not be retold here. Suffice it to say that the world at that time was not prepared to support that international order by curbing the aggressions of Japan. The League pronounced a judgment and proposed a settlement which was tantamount to a surrender to Japan's wishes. But when Japan refused to accept the settlement and withdrew from the League, nothing more was done by the supporters of Collective Security.
  When Japan left the League, a German Cabinet Minister said to the Japanese representative at Geneva: "We don't think you are right, but we thank you for your good example." The good example of Japan has since been successfully followed by other aggressor states in East Africa and Europe.
  The whole structure of post-War world order, which had cost eight and a half million lives and 200 billion dollars to bring into existence and under which the nations, the great and strong as well as the small and weak, lived in comparative peace for more than a decade, now rapidly broke down and was finally scrapped when the new European War began five months ago. The failure of this new world order in sustaining its own principles during this early stage of the Sino-Japanese dispute doomed it to ultimate downfall.
  These, then, are the fundamental issues involved in the Sino-Japanese conflict. A new national state of China has arisen and become the object of fear and attack by the Japanese Imperialists. In trying to crush nationalistic China, Japan has also destroyed the international order, under the shadow of which the Chinese national state had been growing up and gaining strength. In the place of this international order, Japan's militarists are trying to set up the "New Order" of East Asia, which Mr. Hallett Abend has aptly called the "New Disorder."
  Japan's war in China has been going on for more than eight years. Its latest phase of open and continuous hostilities has been going on for 31 months. After 31 months, China's resistance is as determined as ever before, and the war will go on for many months and possibly years to come and will be ended only when China can be assured of a just and honorable peace.
  It is not necessary to remind you that our enemy is bogged down more and more deeply and has shown some anxiety to terminate the so-called"China Incident" which has cost Japan a million casualties, is killing 1,000 of her men a day without a major frontal battle, and has exhausted her gold reserve in two years.
  Under these circumstances, and with the European War going on, many of our American friends are beginning to think that an early peace may be possible in the Far East.
  But I wish to point out to these friends that, as far as I can see, there is no prospect of an early peace. Why? Because the Japanese militaristic caste has not yet repented their aggressive policy, and because so far there is no power, either inside Japan or elsewhere in the world, which can bring that militaristic caste to its senses and make it accept a peace that will be just endurable.
  A just and endurable peace in the Far East must offer satisfactory adjustment to the fundamental issues behind the war. It must fulfill these basic conditions:—

  (1) It must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified, and strong national state.
  (2) It must not result in vindicating any territorial gain or economic advantage acquired by the use of brutal force in open violation of international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations.